| During the very early days of the phone
network, party line phones were the norm and few users expected that their
conversations were private. Today's telephone network offers a much
different story. Individuals, businesses, and organizations generally have
the expectation that their conversations and information transported
across the PSTN are indeed private and secure. Network operators and
service providers have a similar expectation that the security of the
applications and services that manage the network infrastructure are not
compromised. However, as the network architecture evolves and Internet
protocols become an integral part of the converged network infrastructure,
a range of potentially new security risks are emerging.
The network of the future will be transporting various types of traffic
flows, including user (e.g., voice, audio, text, graphics, video, and
telemetry), signaling, routing, and management traffic, over a common
packet-switched infrastructure. The ability to observe or control these
flows may be of interest to various benign or malevolent parties. Their
motivations may differ, but corporate spies, intelligence agencies,
organizational insiders, terrorists, criminals, and hackers all present
real and credible threats to the security and integrity of the network
infrastructure. It is important for the communications industry to
consider these threats and develop meaningful and credible responses so as
not to jeopardize the confidence of end users regarding the integrity of
the network.
THE NETWORK
The PSTN consists of two separate networks: (1) the circuit-switched
portion, which transports the voice and data streams, and (2) the
signaling portion, which manages and controls the network resources and
elements (e.g., service platforms and circuits). Applications that provide
the network services run on service platforms under the direct physical
and logical control of the network operator or service provider and are
typically not directly accessible to end users. End users experience
various services (call forwarding, three-way calling, etc.) but are
generally insulated from all of the interactions within the network that
actually provide these services.
What this means is that the PSTN is effectively a closed network under
the control of a limited number of network operators. This closed
architecture greatly contrasts the current direction of the converged
network infrastructure. The Internet architecture and protocols are
inherently more open than the PSTN architecture and protocols. This is one
of the greatest strengths and greatest weaknesses of the Internet. In the
future, users will have the freedom to manage and provision services much
like network operators do today. These capabilities, together with the
emergence of new, open service architectures; new, "always on"
access technologies (such as DSL and cable), the integrated transport of
user, signaling and management data on a single infrastructure and the
growing proliferation of wireless technologies increase the vulnerability
of network endpoints and elements.
SECURITY
Like anything else, network security is only as strong as its weakest
link. There are many types of attacks (e.g., information gathering, social
engineering, and spoofing attacks) that can possibly exploit the
vulnerabilities of the network. The layering of security frameworks,
policies, protocols, and products is essential to ensure the protection of
applications, services, and the information residing in or traversing the
network. Recent high-profile instances of hacking, denial of service
attacks, viral infections, and worm infections have focused attention on
network endpoints. In the future, network elements themselves will become
increasingly vulnerable to these as well as other types of attacks.
The basic security of a network starts by restricting physical access
to the network elements and moves on to frameworks which provide for the
authentication of the communicating "principals" and for the
assurance of the privacy and integrity of the data in transit between
them. Principals can be defined as people, equipment, or programs that
must be authenticated to verify that they are who they claim to be and
that they are permitted access to the particular network element or
resource in question. If authenticated, a security association is
established between the principals and the data may then be transported
between them.
Data communicated between network elements such as softswitches,
service platforms, gateways, routers, and wireless handsets may consist of
signaling, routing, management, billing, or other information. Certain
fields of the voice and data packets (address fields, location
information, requested services, etc.) will need to be protected on an
end-to-end basis and others on a local basis, since network elements may
need to access the information related to various routing, control, and
service decisions. This processing must take place at wire speed, and if
the information is not properly protected, the integrity of the network
infrastructure could be compromised. A public key encryption and
decryption process negotiates the encryption algorithms, manages the
encryption keys, and maintains the privacy and integrity of the data
transported between the principals.
The actual realization of a security framework could be based on any of
a wide range of proprietary or standards-based forms. There are currently
a number of different approaches: very reminiscent of the communications
industry many years ago. Industry experts are beginning to recognize that
convergence to a common set of standards will be essential to ensure the
effective and widespread deployment of next-generation network
applications and services. Simple security measures consist of placing
firewalls and virus filters at the interfaces between the network
endpoints and elements. In addition, virtual private networks (VPNs) are
becoming an increasingly popular method for providing secure
interconnection between principals.
VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
VPNs address network security concerns using a combination of
authentication, tunneling, and security services. Various VPN approaches
include: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling
Protocol (L2TP), Socks, and IP Security (IPsec). These approaches differ
by the layer they operate at, tunnel encapsulation, authentication
mechanisms, encryption mechanisms, and address assignment mechanisms. PPTP
is the most widely used tunneling protocol and was developed by Microsoft
and several other equipment manufacturers. L2TP was developed by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and is a combination of PPTP and
Cisco's Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol. A combination of L2TP with IPsec will
-- unlike PPTP -- enable the future integration of VPN functionality with
the public key infrastructure.
IP SECURITY
The IPsec standards, adopted by the IETF, facilitate secure
communications between principals on an IP-based infrastructure by
authenticating the principals and ensuring the integrity of the data
moving between them. The Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) key negotiation and
management protocols provide the mechanisms to establish security
associations between principals and to get keys safely to principals, to
reset keys periodically, and to protect their use from theft.
Various methods can be used for principals to learn each other's public
keys. Trusted nodes, known as certificate authorities (CAs), issue and
revoke data structures, known as digital certificates, that state the
mapping between principals and public keys. Digital certificates contain
the issuer's name, the principals identifying information, and a digital
signature. The digital signature provides cryptographic evidence that the
certificate is authentic, unaltered, not forged, and non-repudiable. If a
principal trusts a particular CA and its public key, it can securely know
the public key of the other principals, it can get a certificate signed by
that CA, certifying that the public key belongs to the other principal.
Digital certificates and their usage are specified in the ITU X.509
recommendation.
Data integrity is ensured by encrypting the traffic as it enters the
network and decrypting it at the other end while allowing many different
types of encryption algorithms, key lengths, and key escrow techniques.
Interestingly, since most encryption attacks are focused on determining
the key itself, the security of the data is less dependent on the
encryption algorithms and more dependent on the length of the keys and how
they are assigned. Also, note that data compression must occur before
encryption since encrypted data should look like random bits, which by
definition, have no pattern related to a compression scheme that could be
operated upon.
CONCLUSION
There has been significant focus on security for store-and-forward
applications, such as e-mail and network transport applications such as
browsers, but very little focus has been given to the many vulnerabilities
introduced as the network infrastructure moves towards an open,
packet-based architecture. New paradigms will need to be deployed that not
only address traditional security issues at the network endpoints, such as
PCs, but also address security issues at the network elements that
comprise the access and core infrastructure of the network, such as
softswitches, service platforms, gateways, routers, and wireless handsets.
There are many different approaches for providing network security, but
the IPsec standards, because of their origin and flexibility, are
particularly well suited to ensure the security, privacy, and integrity of
the converged network infrastructure.
Jeff Lawrence is president and CEO of Trillium Digital Systems, a
provider of communications software solutions for computer and
communications equipment manufacturers. Trillium develops, licenses, and
supports standards-based communications software solutions for SS7, ATM,
ISDN, frame relay, V5, IP, and X.25/X.75 technologies. For more
information, visit the company's Web site at trillium.com.
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