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War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution [book review]Jul 01, 2011 (Zimbabwe Independent/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX) -- THIS is the second in a series of reviews of the book War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution. The book is an eye witness account and scholarly analysis of Zimbabwe's political history by Zvakanyorwa Wilbert Sadomba, a lecturer in the University of Zimbabwe's sociology department and a participant in the 1970s guerrilla war. Sadomba delves into the Mugabe leadership era, observing that it had a "very shallow guerrilla war foundation of two years and nine months". This is from March 1977 to December 1979, when the peace negotiations began. By comparison, Sadomba postulates, Herbert Chitepo played a far greater role and for a longer period of nine years (1966 - 75). "This is important to bear in mind in view of the fact that the ruling oligarchy of Zanu PF has mainly used the history of the liberation struggle to legitimise its political hegemony." Mugabe's trump card in leadership, says Sadomba, lay in creating and controlling structures through careful deployment of loyal individuals over whom remote control was possible. "Once he does this, he lets the 'admirer' do the job for him while he muses in the background." The functional distinction between "nationalists" and "fighters" was further underpinned by differential status, divergent experiences, and mental orientation as a result of wartime experiences. "Nationalist leaders were capitalist, mercantilist or professional in orientation, and unexposed to the kinds of military conditions or political training that might have narrowed the gap between them and the combatants. "These contradictions helped explain the cleavage between the war veterans and the nationalists, evident in the failure of political factions within Zanu PF to unite around issues of peasant justice or agrarian development in the post-independence period." Mugabe's success in taking over command of the guerrilla movement in its final stages can be attributed to -- among other things -- his effective diplomacy in winning the support of Frelimo at a critical juncture, and winning the support of the "old guard", in particular militarists Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru). "He was then quick and adept at entrenching his power by embarking on 'structural consolidation' soon after purging the liberation movement of Zipa radicals." Sadomba cites Mugabe's September 1977 speech in which he defined the "party line". The latter was quick to define enemies of the liberation struggle as those bent on bringing "about change in the leadership or structure of the party. "Their actions are a negation of the struggle," Mugabe adds, making it clear that seeking leadership change was tantamount to straying from the "line". Sadomba contrasts this posture with the Chitepo era "where leadership positions were openly contested". He gives the example of Nathan Shamuyarira, who challenged but failed to topple Herbert Chitepo and Josiah Tongogara. In this new era however, coercion, punishment and purgation were hovering threats, and repression of dissent was adopted as the modus operandi. "Internal and external discipline was emphasised to force unequivocal loyalty to nationalist authority at the expense of commitment to organisational objectives and ideology, although such discipline was important in keeping the guerrilla movement cohesive. "The party, Zanu, was redefined exclusively as meaning a 'group' of individual leaders, with the rank and file as coerced followers. The democratic base shrank and power became centralised and concentrated." Sadomba again cites Mugabe's utterances in which he stated that: "When an individual cannot subject himself to discipline, then external discipline must apply. The party must compel him to conform. This is when punishment comes in." This speech, Sadomba observes, is about concentration and centralisation of power without a figment of democracy. "A clique, comprising members of the Central Committee, with no more obligation to listen, dialogue or negotiate, but to demand, henceforth emerged." The emphasis on discipline was enforced by a powerful security department, filled with illiterate cadres from a peasant background, resulting in a reign of terror. Sadomba cites Mugabe, who also says: "We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the Zanu axe would fall on their necks." The Mugabe phase reversed the ideological gains of the liberation struggle, something Sadomba claims Mugabe himself lamented. Within the two year period of his leadership, Sadomba says, guerrilla cadres were drifting into ideological bankruptcy and indiscipline in the rear and on the battlefield. The heavy military inclusion in the Central Committee was hardly for the purposes of power sharing between the guerrillas and nationalists, but rather a strategy on the part of nationalists leaders aimed at complete control of the guerrillas through co-opted commanders. Sadomba moves on to the Lancaster House talks, stating that the Patriotic Front delegation, comprising of Zanu and Zapu, hardly had any plans about the future of those guerrillas who opted out of joining the post independence army. "In fact," Sadomba adds, "the only allusion to the future of the guerrillas was made by Lord Carrington in his concluding remarks after the agreement had already been signed. "He reminded the delegates that many of the guerrillas would wish to return to civilian life, and post-war military planning was a matter for the new government after Independence." On the land issue, Sadomba observes that the white farmers managed to influence the transition to majority rule, using all the mental and material resources at their disposal. Denis Norman, then Commercial Farmers Union president's position paper "became the blueprint of the Lancaster House constitution's clause on land". "In the event, they were successful in negating the land objectives of most fighters, the land-hungry peasants and farm workers in the liberation war." Sadomba enters murky waters, going as far as opining that the proactive approach of the commercial farmers might have included a number of events during the war itself. "The killings of Herbert Chitepo, JZ Moyo and Josiah Tongogara leaders tempered by the armed struggle and the timely release from Rhodesian gaols of civilian nationalists less enthused by the land issue than those who were close to the fighters in the bush, are seen by some in the war veteran-led revolution as a carefully planned anticipatory machination by white farmers to defuse the land issue during the peace negotiations." During the talks the leaders would have been enticed, Sadomba believes, with promises of development aid for fast track modernisation "and told the usual (but untrue) story that wealth would soon trickle down to the poor". "Whatever the case, the nationalists wavered on the land issue... Undoubtedly, the effect of the new Constitution was to end, in a blow, the aspirations of guerrillas and peasant farmers". After demobilisation, ex-combatants faced a situation in which their parents had died or were living in abject poverty. These families in fact looked to the returning ex-combatant for help. "They were not rehabilitated and there were no programmes to reintegrate them into society. Destitution followed. "The volunteers, especially Zipa and Mugabe phase recruits, had abandoned their education, careers or jobs in order to join the war. They now required school fees and a subsistence grant to cover their own basic needs and the needs of their dependents." In general, the war veterans left the war feeling they were not given due recognition by the state or society in general. "Their marginalisation at the moment of victory and general optimism opened up a gulf between the veterans and the wider society, and is important in explaining their enduring sense of occupying an embattled position." lAvailable at Weaver Press and select book stores. |