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INDIA/CHINA: NEGOTIATIONS WITH BURMA FUEL REGIONAL TENSIONS
[January 18, 2008]

INDIA/CHINA: NEGOTIATIONS WITH BURMA FUEL REGIONAL TENSIONS


(English IPS News Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 18, 2008 (IPS/GIN) -- Despite having fought a
war in 1962, India and China are now leading trading partners:
Collaboration was the mainstay of the summit held in Beijing this
month by the world's two most populous countries.

They see eye-to-eye on several key geopolitical issues such as
Iran and have even conducted a joint military exercise, but there
is an item on the bilateral agenda that elicits somewhat less
cooperation: Burma, the country that borders them both.

Burma is not as significant a thorn in the side of the emerging
alliance as Tibet or issues involving territorial claims. India's
provision of safe haven to the Tibetan resistance movement and
China's territorial claims over parts of India both figure more
prominently in cross-border tensions. But the different approaches
that the two Asian powers have taken toward the resource-rich but
poor and isolated Burma, the largest country in Southeast Asia,
reflect important differences in tactics and philosophy.

"After 1988, India with missionary zeal cut off all contact with
the junta in Burma and gave the Nehru Award to Aung Sang Suu Kyi,"
said Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the
Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. Chellaney was the keynote
speaker at a Jan. 16 seminar in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

"By the time India reversed that policy, it realized that it had
lost Burma to China," Chellaney added. "China had built
reconnaissance facilities on the Coco Islands. So, this shift from
a moral, value-based foreign policy to realpolitik on Burma came
after India burned its hands and feet and didn't have much to show
for it."

China, on the other hand, has for some time hewed close to
realpolitik in its support for Burma's military government. "China
always wants to have neighbors that are friendly," said Minxin Pei,
director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. "Burma is like a client state. If China can't
have Burma, it will deny it to another power." Although the level
of trade between the two countries remains rather modest, China
provides the military junta with arms, directs considerable
investment into the country and often eyes Burma's energy
resources.

In addition, China wants to stabilize several cross-border
problems, including AIDS and refugees, said Derek Mitchell, the
director for Asia in the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Also there is
opportunism," he added. "China sees strategic opportunity to have
access, since the United States is ignoring Burma."

This strategic opportunity hinges a great deal on Burma's
location. "For China, Burma is the entryway to the Bay of Bengal
and the Indian Ocean, and it oversees vital communication lanes in
the Strait of Malacca," Chellaney said. "China is busy completing
the Irrawaddy Corridor involving road, river, rail, and
energy-transport links between Burmese ports and Yunnan province."

China's economic growth depends on increased imports of energy,
and Burma is one potential source. "Burma sits on vast gas reserves
which are coveted by its neighbors," Chellaney added.

"But Burma, because it is hit by sanctions and is an isolated
state, hasn't reaped those dividends," the analyst continued.
"Foreign investments in Burma's gas exploration and production have
not been too significant. Sanctions have prevented Burma from
accessing liquefaction technology to become a liquid natural gas
exporter. Its only choice is to sell natural gas by pipeline to its
immediate neighbors -- to Thailand or to China once a pipeline is
complete."

Chellaney predicted that the pipeline to China, news of which
broke at the end of last year, could be operational within a year.

The relationship between China and Burma, which might look cozy
from the outside, is not without tension. Most of the energy and
transportation plans are only at the agreement stage. "Work may
have started on the pipeline," said Priscilla Clapp, former U.S.
charge in Burma from 1999 to 2002. "I cannot believe that it will
happen in a year. Nothing happens in a year in Burma."

Indian reports of a major Chinese military facility in Burma's
Coco Islands, she added, are exaggerated. "They have some antennas
down there. A few years ago India claimed that it was a major
Chinese naval base, but that's bunk. The Burmese won't allow that.
The Burmese are ferociously neutral. They're not going to allow any
other power to establish a military base or significant military
presence in their country."

"China is a partner of last resort," Derek Mitchell said. "The
isolation strategy means that the Burmese junta has to turn to
China. They don't like it, but it helps them stay in power."

The competition between India and China for influence in Burma
reflects a larger jockeying for power between the two Asian giants.
Although the recent summit accentuated the positive, a certain
unease lurks just beneath the surface. History, for instance,
continues to dog the relationship.

"The shadow of the 1962 war bedevils the China-India
relationship," Chellaney said. "It not only weighs heavily on the
Indian psyche, but the wounds of war are kept alive by China's
assertive claims to additional Indian territory."

The different systems of political economy in China and India
might also pull the two countries in divergent directions. Instead
of India and China helping their fellow Asian countries to identify
common norms and values -- which undergird other regional
formations such as the European Union -- the two countries might
part strategic ways. Chellaney speculated that two blocs could well
emerge: "a China-led coalition that values centralized domestic
control and whose favorite institution is the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, versus a constellation of democracies loosely tied
together by a web of strategic partnerships."

Another potential source of tension is water. All the major
rivers of Asia, with the exception of the Ganges, originate in the
Tibetan plateau. China's control of the headwaters of the Indus,
Mekong, Yangtze, Brahmaputra and other rivers, which together serve
nearly half the world's population, may prove an increasing
challenge to the region, particularly as Beijing dams these major
rivers for hydropower and irrigation. "If water geopolitics were
to spur interstate tensions," Chellaney warned, "the Asian
renaissance would definitely stall."

Minxin Pei remains somewhat more optimistic. He noted that both
countries have exercised strategic restraint in recent years. In
part, this restraint can be explained by the differing strategic
priorities of the countries, with China looking east toward Taiwan
and Japan and India primarily focusing on South Asia.

The leaders in the respective countries also "understand that
gains from seizing the strategic opportunity available are far more
important than possible gains from strategic competition," Pei
pointed out. "Globalization means that India and China, with their
cheap labor, will benefit from this opportunity. If they throw away
this opportunity and engage in competition with each other, it is
a lose-lose proposition."

With bilateral trade booming and sources of tension largely
under the surface, India and China are not at risk of going head
to head over their differing approaches to Burma any time soon.

India's realpolitik engagement with the military junta is
balanced by its unofficial but close links to the democracy
movement. China, meanwhile, has real economic and security
interests in Burma but is sensitive to international criticisms of
its positions. When he raised the Burma issue in discussions with
Chinese officials, Derek Mitchell was told that Burma "wasn't on
the radar screen. Chinese policy wasn't going to change, there were
too many other things going on. 'What if others isolate China's
position?' I asked. 'Well, then we might think about it,' they
said. That's the thing that China hates the most: being isolated."

Perhaps because it is not a priority issue for the two
countries, Burma might evolve from a point of contention to an
opportunity for even greater cooperation. A stable Burma that is
part of the international community could benefit both China and
India. China has demonstrated its ability in the North Korea crisis
to serve as a catalyst for compromise in a regional negotiating
framework. India might take a page from this book.

"India failed to persuade the junta to engage Aung San Suu Kyi
more effectively and stem the growth of Chinese influence," Brahma
Chellaney concluded. "Should India give up? No, it can play the
role of facilitator of a final political reconciliation in Burma."

Copyright ? 2008 Global Information Network

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