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China aims to rule the waves with its 'string of pearls'(Lloyds List Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)First Person - Ben Macfarlane Sea power is arguably an archaic concept in the present age of nuclear weapons and terrorist attacks. However, the concept is still very much alive in China. Increasingly, China is devoting resources to her naval and maritime interests: economic development, territorial management, guaranteeing her trade routes and her offshore oil and gas fields. A navy sufficiently powerful to further her objectives is being rapidly developed or purchased from abroad. The US Defense Department views China's goal as being the construction of a series of military and diplomatic strategic bases described by Hideaki Kaneda, retired Vice Admiral of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, as a 'string of pearls'. This would consist of a series of ports along the major sea lanes from the South China Sea to the oil fields of the Middle East. In a sense, this goal mimics the Portuguese and English strategy from the beginning of the 16th century onwards, of building naval bases that included Goa, Malacca and Singapore which were themselves strung along the sea trade routes to East Asia. China is considering building container and oil facilities at Chittagong in Bangladesh for its naval and merchant fleets, as well as more naval bases and electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands owned by Myanmar in the Gulf of Bengal. In a parallel move, Pakistan's Gwadar deepwater port, which China is helping to construct in southwest Pakistan, is strategically placed to guard the Persian Gulf. China dominated Asia in terms of sea power until the 17th century. But for the last three centuries, China has not had a global maritime strategy and has not possessed the naval forces capable of supporting such a strategy. China's current maritime strategy has its roots in the US (perceived as a key strategic rival), namely in the sea power theory developed by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan at the end of the 19th century. In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, Adm Mahan argued that China's maritime power and economic development were closely connected: that the development of China as a maritime power was integral to its economic success. Adm Mahan identified the conditions that determine sea power: these included a long coastline, a population attuned to maritime expedition and a government keen to promote sea power. These conditions applied to the US in Adm Mahan's time, and they still apply to China today. China is now the world's third largest trading nation and is rapidly developing its port capacities to manage an ever increasing volume of trade. Its ship tonnage (excluding fleets that sail under flags of convenience) is the fourth largest in the world. Rapid expansion of ship tonnage is part of China's current five-year plan, and by 2010 its shipbuilding capabilities is likely to rival those of Japan and South Korea. Bangladesh is allowing use of its Chittagong Port to the Chinese navy, providing it access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. The importance of this port lies in the fact that it provides a deep-water anchorage a few miles inland from the sea. The navigation distance from the outer bar on the Bay of Bengal to the main berths on the bank of the river Karnafuli being 16km. The location of the port and its natural harbour made it an important centre of trade and business as far back as the 9th century AD, when Arab merchants discovered its potential as a trading centre. The Chinese chronicler Ma Haun, who visited Chittagong in 1405 with a Chinese mission, refers to 'Chit-le-gan' as a port visited by Chinese trading vessels. The most frequent visitors to the port were the Arabs. To some extent, China already enjoys access to the Bay of Bengal thanks to the Myanmar government, which also provides it with offshore naval and electronic surveillance facilities at the Coco Islands between the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea. There are reports that China has expressed a willingness to invest in a deepsea port at the mouth of the river leading to the Chittagong Port or its adjacent areas. A high-powered delegation from China is already engaged in talks with the Chittagong Port Authority. Similarly, Pakistan's port of Gwadar, located at the entrance of the Middle East Gulf and about 460 km from Karachi, has had immense geo-strategic significance. Continuing instability within the Middle East Gulf in the aftermath of the Iran'Iraq war and the Gulf wars and the emergence of the new Central Asian States has added to its importance. China's eastern seaboard ports are 3,000 km away from Kashgar, western China's main city, whereas the distance from Kashgar to the Pakistani coastal town of Gwadar, on Balochistan's Makran coast, is only 1,500km. Given this fact, there is an obvious and huge cost advantage for China to use Gwadar as the gateway port for its western region. This explains China's interest in helping Pakistan develop Gwadar into a fully-fledged commercial port, capable of handling cargo vessels of up to 50,000 tons or more. There is also a pressing need to guarantee China's oil supplies, with China becoming a net oil importer in 1993. As its need for oil has grown, so has its dependence on supplies from the Middle East. Some 80% of China's oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait, the closing of which would cause devastation to the Chinese economy. To reduce this dependence, China has been working to build alternative supply routes through Myanmar to the south and Pakistan to the west. A road, and eventually a pipeline, from Gwadar to western China could give China an alternative energy route that it urgently needs to continue the development of its westernmost provinces. Its promise to provide more than a billion dollars in aid and loan guarantees for building at Gwadar underlies its commitment to this project. The Gwadar Port Project arose from a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed in March 2002, under which China Harbour Construction Corporation will build the port. Beijing has provided $198m and Islamabad $50m. The scope of phase one included the construction of three multi-purpose berths, each 200 m long and capable of handling vessels up to 30,000 dwt and was completed at a cost of $250m in November 2004 with Chinese assistance in less than three years. Phase two began in May 2005. This second phase will include the deepening of the port at a cost of $865m. China has promised to provide a $50m soft loan. Gwadar is envisaged as developing as a regional hub. It would serve commercial traffic to and from the Middle East, the Middle East Gulf, China's Xinjiang province, Iran, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Its location, at the mouth of the Middle East Gulf and at the opposite end from the strategic choke points of the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, adds to its strategic importance. Additionally, the port would make use of the opportunities that lie in Pakistan's exclusive economic zone, which so far have remained largely unexplored. The area is known to be rich in fisheries and, if the 600 km long coastline was fully exploited, this could give a substantial boost to fish and crab exports and promote food processing industries. Gwadar, lying close to the oil rich Gulf-states, could also provide a potential source of offshore gas and oil reserves. Beijing intends to take advantage of Gwadar's most accessible international trade routes to the Tibet Autonomous Region. The plan envisages extending China's east-west railway from the Chinese border city of Kashi to Peshawar in Pakistan's northwest. Cargo to and from Gwadar could then be delivered to China along the shortest route, from Karachi to Peshawar. The same road and rail network could also be used to supply oil from the Middle East Gulf to the western provinces of China. Additionally, China could gain rail and road access to Iran through Pakistan's internal road and rail network. By using Gwadar Port, China which is one of the fastest growing economies in the world would ensure the growth of both the port and the neighbouring coastline, as well as enhance Gwadar's overall commercial and strategic value. Gwadar will give the Chinese an opportunity to establish for the first time a naval presence in the Arabian Sea and Western part of the Indian Ocean. Beijing has all along denied that the Gwadar project has any military dimension. It is, Beijing emphasises, a civilian port. At the same time, the Chinese, who import significant amounts of oil from the Persian Gulf, maintain that their interest in having a secure and uninterrupted flow of oil is justified. Joint naval exercises, goodwill visits by its naval ships and increased trade and commercial activity with Pakistan are likely to raise China's profile in the Arabian Sea. As a matter of policy, China has always assisted Pakistan in strengthening its defensive capability. Beijing's involvement in the Gwadar sea port project is motivated primarily by commercial considerations, but there are also distinct advantages for both countries if their navies share a friendly port of call close to the Gulf region. If to this equation a reliable network of road and rail links is added, both Pakistan and China are sure to benefit commercially and strategically from the development of the new port in Gwadar. - The author is principal of B J Macfarlane ' Co, a specialist shipping and insurance law firm in the City of London. |