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INTERVIEW WITH EFRAIM HALEVY, HEAD OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND POLICY STUDIES AT THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY AND FORMER HEAD OF THE ISRAELI MOSSAD, DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTI- NATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON AND THE OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL'S CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN (IBA RESHET BET RADIO, 07:40 (GMT+3) JULY 26, 2006)
[August 26, 2006]

INTERVIEW WITH EFRAIM HALEVY, HEAD OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND POLICY STUDIES AT THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY AND FORMER HEAD OF THE ISRAELI MOSSAD, DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTI- NATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON AND THE OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL'S CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN (IBA RESHET BET RADIO, 07:40 (GMT+3) JULY 26, 2006)


(Federal News Service (Middle East) Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)

(Note - The following was translated from Hebrew)

Q: And with us on the telephone is Efraim Halevy, former
Mossad chief and head of the National Security Council.

Good morning to you.

EFRAIM HALEVY: Good morning.

Q: Do you believe that a multinational force in southern
Lebanon is the right solution, even if they are not responsible for
disarming Hezbollah?

MR. HALEVY: I think that a multinational force in southern
Lebanon is only one component of a satisfactory resolution.

I do not think that a multinational force would defend Israel,
and I think we should be wary of a situation where multinational
forces would be portrayed as defending Israel.

Already this morning I have seen that there is an initiative by
the Palestinian Authority, proposing that a multinational force be
deployed along the borders of Judea and Samaria.

Therefore, it is necessary to carefully examine the purpose of
the multinational forces - not only in the Lebanese context but also
in the overall regional context.

Q: What is your reaction to Minister of Defense Amir
Peretz's declaration yesterday that we will probably have to establish
a security zone in southern Lebanon - Without taking over the
territory, but perhaps with aerial control of these areas, for
example?

MR. HALEVY: It is clear that from our standpoint, the
(desired) result of the campaign is the end of missiles threatening
northern Israel - at the (very) minimum. If there is no other option,
I think that the Minister of Defense will take that step.

Q: Meaning that eventually it will become clear that we
should not have pulled out from the security zone six years ago, in
May 2000?

MR. HALEVY: No, this is not what would become clear at all.
We left under specific circumstances.

In the last six years, there has not been any extended fighting
in the north, and I think we have achieved a lot. I am not sure we
could have waged the Intifada campaign as we did if the situation in
the north had continued the way it was on the eve of our pullout.

Q: There are those who claim that the Intifada erupted
because the terrorists saw how quickly we pulled out of Lebanon.

MR. HALEVY: True, there are those who claim that, but that
is something that would require proof - and historians, not
commentators on the current situation, would be the ones to know that
kind of thing.

Q: At any rate, it is a fact that during those six years,
Hezbollah built up its strength - all the fortifications and the
missiles and everything - in southern Lebanon, right up to the border
with Israel.

I want to ask you, as the one who headed the National Security
Council - did you pay attention to this fortification, to the
strengthening of Hezbollah along the border with us, that now enables
them to launch 100 missiles a day?

MR. HALEVY: During my time, the National Security Council
did pay attention to this issue. From 2002 to 2003, extensive work was
carried out regarding this matter, including a thorough examination of
everything known at the time as the 'northern system.'

The National Security Council submitted its remarks to the
political echelon at the time --

Q: -- what were your recommendations?

MR. HALEVY: We thought that the issues of southern Lebanon
and Hezbollah should be handled from a global perspective.

The Iranian nuclear issue had to be linked to the 'northern
issue', and the question of whether or not it would be correct to take
action against southern Lebanon should be carefully examined - not
only in the context of southern Lebanon, but also in the context of
Iran's general status in the region.

We suggested that a comprehensive discussion be conducted on
this issue, at the highest level of the government.

Q: Did the discussion take place?

MR. HALEVY: To my knowledge, there was no discussion.

Q: Was Syria mentioned in this context?

The idea has been circulating in left-wing circles that we
should have spoken with Syria about a peace agreement and could have
prevented Syria's support of Hezbollah.

MR. HALEVY: I do remember that Syria was mentioned in that
context at the time. I do not --

At any rate, regarding a recommendation to have a dialogue with
Syria at the time, I think we assessed that the Syrian administration
would not be a willing partner. I think that we would have come to the
same conclusion today.

In its present composition, with the current person heading its
administration, (Syria) is not a dialogue partner regarding a (peace)
settlement.

Q: Efraim Halevy, one question regarding the decision-
making process in our government. Today, there is an article in the
Haaretz newspaper about an investigation they did.

All in all, it has been about two weeks since the war began. The
conclusions from the article are that the decision-making process was
too hasty, and the objectives established are both vague and perhaps
also too ambitious. Those are the claims of this investigation, at
least.

Do you agree with these statements?

MR. HALEVY: First of all, I do not know the entire
decision-making process leading up to the recent events. It could be
that there were procedures that have not been made public - that have
been concealed from the public.

What is true is that the decision-making process was very quick.
As to the objectives of the war, my impression is that they are being
modified to the real capacity, which is being revealed de facto during
the course of the operation.

It is not only the original objectives of the operation that are
important.

Q: So you are saying that the original objectives were
exaggerated?

MR. HALEVY: I do not know if they were exaggerated. It
could be that they were realistic, but it turned out that they had to
modify the objectives to meet the circumstances. This is often the
case - that you go out on a (military) campaign and during the course
of it you become aware of aspects you did not pay attention to before,
or which were new, or were created during the campaign.

You must modify the objectives to the capacity of the forces as
(the situation) is revealed on the ground.

Q: And was the quick escalation, after the abduction of two
of our soldiers, inevitable?

MR. HALEVY: I do not think it was inevitable. It was the
result of a strategic decision of the country's leadership --

Q: -- a correct decision?

MR. HALEVY: -- I will immediately respond to that, and take
a different path from the one we have taken until now.

In previous governments, I think that the -- in the campaign,
whether it was right or wrong will reveal itself (in the future). With
regards to the course of combat now, I am not sure that it is right to
discuss the question of whether the decision was correct or not.

The correctness of this decision will reveal itself only at the
end of the campaign.

Q: Okay, we will wait until its end.

I want to thank you very much, Efraim Halevy, former head of the
Mossad and current head of the National Security Council.

Copyright 2006 Federal News Service, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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