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INTERVIEW WITH EFRAIM HALEVY, HEAD OF THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND POLICY STUDIES AT THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY AND FORMER HEAD OF THE ISRAELI MOSSAD, DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTI- NATIONAL FORCES IN LEBANON AND THE OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL'S CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN (IBA RESHET BET RADIO, 07:40 (GMT+3) JULY 26, 2006)(Federal News Service (Middle East) Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge) (Note - The following was translated from Hebrew) Q: And with us on the telephone is Efraim Halevy, former Mossad chief and head of the National Security Council. Good morning to you. EFRAIM HALEVY: Good morning. Q: Do you believe that a multinational force in southern Lebanon is the right solution, even if they are not responsible for disarming Hezbollah? MR. HALEVY: I think that a multinational force in southern Lebanon is only one component of a satisfactory resolution. I do not think that a multinational force would defend Israel, and I think we should be wary of a situation where multinational forces would be portrayed as defending Israel. Already this morning I have seen that there is an initiative by the Palestinian Authority, proposing that a multinational force be deployed along the borders of Judea and Samaria. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully examine the purpose of the multinational forces - not only in the Lebanese context but also in the overall regional context. Q: What is your reaction to Minister of Defense Amir Peretz's declaration yesterday that we will probably have to establish a security zone in southern Lebanon - Without taking over the territory, but perhaps with aerial control of these areas, for example? MR. HALEVY: It is clear that from our standpoint, the (desired) result of the campaign is the end of missiles threatening northern Israel - at the (very) minimum. If there is no other option, I think that the Minister of Defense will take that step. Q: Meaning that eventually it will become clear that we should not have pulled out from the security zone six years ago, in May 2000? MR. HALEVY: No, this is not what would become clear at all. We left under specific circumstances. In the last six years, there has not been any extended fighting in the north, and I think we have achieved a lot. I am not sure we could have waged the Intifada campaign as we did if the situation in the north had continued the way it was on the eve of our pullout. Q: There are those who claim that the Intifada erupted because the terrorists saw how quickly we pulled out of Lebanon. MR. HALEVY: True, there are those who claim that, but that is something that would require proof - and historians, not commentators on the current situation, would be the ones to know that kind of thing. Q: At any rate, it is a fact that during those six years, Hezbollah built up its strength - all the fortifications and the missiles and everything - in southern Lebanon, right up to the border with Israel. I want to ask you, as the one who headed the National Security Council - did you pay attention to this fortification, to the strengthening of Hezbollah along the border with us, that now enables them to launch 100 missiles a day? MR. HALEVY: During my time, the National Security Council did pay attention to this issue. From 2002 to 2003, extensive work was carried out regarding this matter, including a thorough examination of everything known at the time as the 'northern system.' The National Security Council submitted its remarks to the political echelon at the time -- Q: -- what were your recommendations? MR. HALEVY: We thought that the issues of southern Lebanon and Hezbollah should be handled from a global perspective. The Iranian nuclear issue had to be linked to the 'northern issue', and the question of whether or not it would be correct to take action against southern Lebanon should be carefully examined - not only in the context of southern Lebanon, but also in the context of Iran's general status in the region. We suggested that a comprehensive discussion be conducted on this issue, at the highest level of the government. Q: Did the discussion take place? MR. HALEVY: To my knowledge, there was no discussion. Q: Was Syria mentioned in this context? The idea has been circulating in left-wing circles that we should have spoken with Syria about a peace agreement and could have prevented Syria's support of Hezbollah. MR. HALEVY: I do remember that Syria was mentioned in that context at the time. I do not -- At any rate, regarding a recommendation to have a dialogue with Syria at the time, I think we assessed that the Syrian administration would not be a willing partner. I think that we would have come to the same conclusion today. In its present composition, with the current person heading its administration, (Syria) is not a dialogue partner regarding a (peace) settlement. Q: Efraim Halevy, one question regarding the decision- making process in our government. Today, there is an article in the Haaretz newspaper about an investigation they did. All in all, it has been about two weeks since the war began. The conclusions from the article are that the decision-making process was too hasty, and the objectives established are both vague and perhaps also too ambitious. Those are the claims of this investigation, at least. Do you agree with these statements? MR. HALEVY: First of all, I do not know the entire decision-making process leading up to the recent events. It could be that there were procedures that have not been made public - that have been concealed from the public. What is true is that the decision-making process was very quick. As to the objectives of the war, my impression is that they are being modified to the real capacity, which is being revealed de facto during the course of the operation. It is not only the original objectives of the operation that are important. Q: So you are saying that the original objectives were exaggerated? MR. HALEVY: I do not know if they were exaggerated. It could be that they were realistic, but it turned out that they had to modify the objectives to meet the circumstances. This is often the case - that you go out on a (military) campaign and during the course of it you become aware of aspects you did not pay attention to before, or which were new, or were created during the campaign. You must modify the objectives to the capacity of the forces as (the situation) is revealed on the ground. Q: And was the quick escalation, after the abduction of two of our soldiers, inevitable? MR. HALEVY: I do not think it was inevitable. It was the result of a strategic decision of the country's leadership -- Q: -- a correct decision? MR. HALEVY: -- I will immediately respond to that, and take a different path from the one we have taken until now. In previous governments, I think that the -- in the campaign, whether it was right or wrong will reveal itself (in the future). With regards to the course of combat now, I am not sure that it is right to discuss the question of whether the decision was correct or not. The correctness of this decision will reveal itself only at the end of the campaign. Q: Okay, we will wait until its end. I want to thank you very much, Efraim Halevy, former head of the Mossad and current head of the National Security Council. Copyright 2006 Federal News Service, Inc. All Rights Reserved. |