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Malaysia criticized Japan over 1975 Red Army hostage crisis: files+(Japan Economic Newswire Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)LONDON, Dec. 29_(Kyodo) _ Tensions between the governments handling the Japanese Red Army hostage crisis in Malaysia in 1975 are revealed through British government files released to the public Thursday. They show Malaysian officials were critical of Tokyo's slow response and Japan was frustrated by the lack of assistance from the United States, whose consulate in Kuala Lumpur was targeted by the terrorists. The documents also reveal that the chief Malaysian negotiator was confident he could have eliminated or captured all of the hostage takers at one stage in the ordeal, but feared that doing so would stimulate repeat attacks all over the world. In August 1975, five JRA members took about 50 people hostage at the consulate, including the U.S. consul and Swedish charge d'affaires. They said they would kill the hostages if Tokyo did not agree to release seven JRA members who were in Japanese prisons. The Japanese government agreed to the demands, although only five of the prisoners took up the offer of freedom. The prisoners were flown to Kuala Lumpur on a Japan Airlines aircraft, together with a crew of nine. Once the plane landed in Kuala Lumpur, the remaining hostages were handed over. The aircraft then left for Tripoli with the hijackers and former prisoners. Also on board were two Japanese government officials and two Malaysian officials who were there to ensure a safe passage. The JAL crew and government officials were released upon arrival in Libya. James Craig, Britain's deputy high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, recounted a long conversation he had had with the U.S. charge d'affaires at the time following the incident. The American diplomat told him that the chief negotiator during the crisis, Malaysian Interior Minister Tan Sri Ghazali, was "no doubt at times...genuinely irritated by the Japanese." Malaysia was particularly concerned about the time it was taking to persuade JAL to supply an aircraft to transport the prisoners from Japan and then on to Libya. Craig, summarizing the U.S. diplomat's views for his bosses in London, wrote, "The Japanese minister of transport who came here for the negotiations was disagreeable and the Japanese ambassador was clumsy: he seemed at one stage to reveal that the need to persuade JAL was only a ploy. "During the final negotiations at the airport the Malaysians seemed to suspect that the Japanese were trying some tricks without taking the Malaysians into their confidence -- for example, they wondered whether the insistence on a double (JAL) crew meant that the extra men came from some special unit." Craig said he believed that Malaysia had sent a complaint to the Japanese government over the handling of the crisis. "Certainly after the affair was over, the Japanese ambassador was very down-hearted and in need of reassurance," Craig wrote. The U.S. charge told Craig the Japanese were angry with the U.S. position, which was not to offer any advice or approach any government regarding safe havens. But the American diplomat did advise Malaysia to start talking to the hostage takers, for which he earned a rebuke from Washington. The U.S. charge said Japan took the right decision in the end, but concluded that Japanese-Malaysian relations had been hurt by the incident. In another conversation, Ghazali told Craig he could have killed or captured all the hijackers during the handover of the remaining hostages at the airport when two hijackers were inside the aircraft and three were outside on the tarmac. At the time, there were 10 Malaysian commandos at the scene. Craig wrote, "He (Ghazali) had only to press the button and the three terrorists on the ground would have been shot by snipers and the 10 policemen would have stormed the aircraft. "Perhaps one or two hostages might have been killed but the terrorists themselves would all have been shot or captured. But he (Ghazali) could not do it: he was haunted by the thought that if he did, Malaysian ambassadors and their families in all parts of the world would have been the victims of Japanese Red Army reprisals." But the American diplomat said that, in any event, relations between Japan and Malaysia were so poor toward the end of the affair that any attempt to end the crisis was impossible. Craig also revealed that another Malaysian official told him that two of the Japanese terrorists had carried grenades en route to Libya, despite assurances that they had gotten rid of all their explosives. Following the crisis, it is understood that the Libyan authorities did not charge any of the JRA members, several of whom were involved in subsequent terrorist attacks. The terrorists included Haruo Wako, who was this year sentenced to life imprisonment in Tokyo for his role in the 1975 incident. Also involved was Junzo Okudaira who is still on the run. The Japanese Red Army was founded by Fusako Shigenobu in February 1971 and its height was one of the most feared terrorist groups in the world. It has close ties to the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine. |