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Burak Bekdil: Kurdish gambit(Turkish Daily News Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)Forget Boris Akunin's best-seller, "The Turkish Gambit." (Actually, Mr. Akunin is Grigory Chkhartishvili.) That was set in the 19th century Balkans. Kurdish gambit is no fiction, perhaps a kind of political best-seller, and it is set in the 21st century Middle East. Kurdish gambit looks well set. It may not be so. Let's first sum up a few facts: 1. The (separatist) Kurds make up the "vulnerable" part of four states in this part of the world: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. And the "vulnerability" these days looks deeper because there is "broader" Kurdish activity in Syria's Kurdish areas, sparked possibly by the Paris-based former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, and there is "broader" Kurdish activity in Iran's Sunni and Kurdish areas via the (the Kurdish separatist) Pejak. 2. The "Kurdish dispute" in all four countries looks to have gone beyond a "local" identity, and it is heading for a common "regional" identity. 3. The immediate conclusion, under the circumstances, is that the Kurds may eventually be rushing toward a "state" with the support of all non-Kurd and non-Arab (and non-Turkish, of course) powers who would benefit from a non-Arab state in the region, especially when at stake are vast energy resources in a world that grows more hungry for energy with every new day. It is natural to expect the Kurds to "formalize" independence where they are the strongest: Iraq. 4. The "Kurdish movement" in Turkey looks doomed to remain "local." Supporting Turkey's (separatist) Kurds, through direct or subtle means, however, will earn Massoud Barzani time and ground in his battle. All this illustrates that Turkey, Syria and Iran are being forced to accept that a carving of a Kurdish state out of what is now Iraq could actually be a better thing than increased Kurdish violence in their own territories. But all three invariably think otherwise: Ankara, Damascus and Tehran commonly believe that increased Kurdish frictions in their territories actually began with increased Kurdish influence over Iraqi affairs. In fact, the "blackmail" only sharpens the anti-Kurdish front and sentiment in all of the three states. Despite all the handsome sharing of the plunder in northern Iraq, things may become unstable in the future. Yes, there has been a powerful injection of "Western" cash into the area. And, yes, that cash inflow makes all otherwise hostile factions "brothers in arms." But things may turn sour when the cash inflow slows down. There are already indications of potential future hostilities among present allies -- sectarian or ethnic. The plain truth is that alliances/hostilities on the West-Iraq axis may change at any time in the future: Friends today and foes tomorrow, or vice versa. March 19, 2003 was only the beginning, not the end of the gringo gambit in the Iraqi quagmire. It may succeed or fail; it's too early to tell, for what we see today are only the early moves on the chess board. But Kurdish gambit may end up in another disappointment as longer-term real-politik could force the players to change the expected moves and even sides, perhaps due to demographic "force majeur." One thing is certain though: In this part of the world, it's going to be "friends today, foes tomorrow; and vice versa." |