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Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on AIRLAND HearingApr 16, 2010 (Congressional Documents and Publications/ContentWorks via COMTEX) -- Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide the DOT&E assessments of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Increment 1, the Stryker Double-V Hull Upgrade and Mobile Gun System, the Ground Combat Vehicle, the UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter, and the Ground Mobile Radio and Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Factor variants of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program. Assessment of E-IBCT Test Results The DOT&E operational assessment of the Early Infantry Brigade (E-IBCT) Increment 1 performance is based upon the results of the E-IBCT Limited User Test (LUT 09) conducted in August - September 2009 and the Non Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) Flight LUT conducted in January - February 2010. That assessment is supplemented with data from developmental testing, as appropriate. Each of the E-IBCT systems requires further development prior to conducting an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) in FY11 or fielding. All of the systems have notable performance deficiencies. The demonstrated operational reliability for each of the systems falls significantly below requirements. LUT 09 was the first operational test of the E-IBCT systems. It was conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas, and consisted of an infantry company and scout platoon equipped with E-IBCT systems executing full spectrum operations against a threat force composed of conventional mechanized forces and paramilitary forces with civilians present on the battlefield. The force-on-force test consisted of four 96-hour scenarios with the test unit executing fourteen offensive, defensive, and stability missions. Operations were conducted both day and night. Live firing of the NLOS-LS was conducted during the NLOS-LS Flight LUT at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in January-February 2010. Many of the systems tested in LUT 09 were not in the same configuration as the systems intended for purchase. The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle used a production radio, the remaining five systems used pre-production radios and waveforms. Numerous changes to be implemented in the E-IBCT systems to be produced (as compared to those tested in LUT 09) had been identified prior to LUT 09. The program manager has informed DOT&E that additional changes will be made to address the reliability problems discovered during the LUT. The first opportunity to test the effects of these changes and any others made to address performance problems identified in LUT 09 will be the E-IBCT LUT to be conducted in August-September 2010 (LUT 10). The E-IBCT systems have not been tested against electronic warfare or computer network attack threats. E-IBCT operations in an electronic warfare and computer network attack environments will be assessed in LUT 10. The DOT&E key findings with respect to the performance of the individual EIBCT systems are summarized below. Non Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS). NLOS-LS requires further developmental and operational flight tests to demonstrate improvement in missile reliability and the performance of the missile's infrared (IR) seeker. The demonstrated missile reliability is 61 percent, below the 85 percent requirement. Missiles using the IR seeker in developmental and LUT flight tests hit 5 of 11 targets. The program needs to conduct additional testing and allocate adequate time to demonstrate performance and implement fixes to improve reliability. The NLOS-LS Container Launch Unit (CLU) met its reliability requirement during LUT 09, demonstrating a 259-hour mean time between system abort versus a 125-hour requirement. However, during the February 10 Flight LUT, problems with the NLOS-LS navigation system caused six of the seven total system aborts that occurred during testing, resulting in a mean time between system abort of 12 hours. This was the first test using a new software version for the NLOS-LS navigation system. Soldiers received numerous fault codes from the navigation system when they initialized the CLU. Failure review is ongoing. In our view, the effectiveness of fixes to the navigation system and other failure modes should be tested in the E-IBCT LUT 10 conducted later this year. NLOS-LS is making progress in some performance areas. Missiles using the laser-designate mode demonstrated success in operational and developmental testing, hitting 5 of 7 targets. The missile warhead can kill armored vehicles when it hits vulnerable areas. In LUT 09, the NLOS-LS Container Launch Unit was interoperable with the fire support network and was effective in processing electronic fire commands. During LUT 09, the test unit effectively engaged armored targets with the NLOS-LS in simulated fire missions. When simulated and evaluated to be successful, NLOS-LS had a significant impact on the battle by destroying threat armored vehicles. The NLOS-LS Flight LUT was the first operational flight test of the system. Soldiers from the Army Evaluation Task Force Fires Battalion fired six missions at operationally representative threat targets. Forward observers their tactical sensors and target designators acquired actual threat tanks, armored combat vehicles, and a commercial truck. The tanks and armored combat vehicles had realistic threat countermeasures. The Precision Attack Munition and the Container Launch Unit (CLU) were production representative. During the Flight LUT, two of six missiles fired achieved target hits and four missed their targets. Two of the missiles impacted 14 or more kilometers short of the target. The cause of one miss is known: the CLU misinterpreted temperature data sent by the Advanced Field Artillery Data System. This caused the missile to safe the warhead and ignore the laser designation, thereby missing the target. The Army has identified potential causes for two other misses involving the motor in the precision attack munitions and a circuit board failure. The Army has informed DOT&E that the program is completing Failure Review Board investigations of the developmental and operational flight failures. We recommend the Army conduct additional developmental and operational flight testing once all of the necessary corrective measures have been identified and applied. Network Integration Kit (NIK). In LUT 09, the NIK demonstrated a capability to receive sensor data from the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor and Urban Unattended Ground Sensor Gateways and to interoperate with the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below battle command network by passing messages and still images. The NIK operated with pre-production pre- Engineering Development Model Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radios which are not certified to pass classified traffic. The NIK did not meet its reliability requirement, demonstrating a 33hour mean time between system abort versus a requirement of 112 hours. The NIK had a lengthy boot up time of 30-35 minutes versus a 10 minute requirement for a warm start reboot. The capability of the NIK to pass classified data using low probability of intercept waveforms will be evaluated in LUT 10. Class I Block 0 Unmanned Aircraft System. The Class 1 UAS meets most of its air vehicle flight and sensor performance requirements. This system was heavily used by the test unit to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks. However, the UAS was not employed as the back-packable company-level and platoon-level asset envisioned by the user. Due to poor system reliability, the unit consolidated these systems under centralized battalion-level control to achieve system redundancy. The UAS does not have the range or endurance necessary to conduct missions within a larger battalion area of operations. An assessment cannot be made of the effectiveness of the UAS employed in the platoon/company role for which it is designed. The Class 1 UAS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time between system abort of 1.5 hours versus a 23-hour user threshold requirement. Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle Block 1 (SUGV). During LUT 09, the SUGV demonstrated a capability for remote investigation of potential threats. The test unit successfully demonstrated the capability to transmit still images from the SUGV to the Network Integration Kit via an Unattended Ground Sensor Gateway. The SUGV sensor performs satisfactorily in daylight, providing images that can identify personnel at 100 meters, achieving the user requirement. The SUGV does not meet the user requirement for recognizing personnel at night. The most significant SUGV operational deficiency is the limited communications range between the operator and the SUGV. The SUGV user requirement calls for a 1,000 meter line-of-sight tele-operation range. This range allows the operator to employ the robot at a safe distance while conducting reconnaissance of potentially hazardous locations. During LUT 09, much shorter ranges were achieved. Typical tele-operation ranges were 125-150 meters in open terrain and 50-75 meters in and around buildings. These short tele-operation ranges exposed SUGV operators to hostile fire. Several operators were evaluated as killed during the LUT. During LUT 09, the SUGV demonstrated a 5.2-hour mean time between system abort versus a requirement of 42 hours. Urban Unattended Ground Sensor (U-UGS). The U-UGS demonstrated little contribution to unit situational awareness, providing limited actionable intelligence. Images were often blurry or blank and not readable. During LUT 09, the Local Display and Control Device was not used by the unit, although it is essential to providing local unit leaders U-UGS alerts and images. The U-UGS has demonstrated a capability to transmit images to the NIK via a gateway device. The U-UGS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time between system abort of 25 hours versus a requirement of 105 hours. Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor (T-UGS). The T-UGS provided little contribution to unit situational awareness. During LUT 09, it provided no actionable intelligence to the test unit, with half of its photo images blank or blurry. The T-UGS demonstrated a capability to transmit images to the NIK. The T-UGS is not reliable, demonstrating a mean time between system abort of 52 hours versus a requirement of 127 hours. Reliability. The Army Test and Evaluation Command calculated reliability growth potentials for the NIK, U-UGS, T-UGS, SUGV and Class 1 UAS that are all below the reliability thresholds associated with each system. Thus, the reliability desired for these systems is not achievable by IOT&E without an extensive design-for- reliability effort by the Army. Stryker Double-V Hull Recently, the Army leadership decided to investigate using the Double-V Hull design developed under the Stryker Modernization effort for vehicles to be deployed to Afghanistan. Testing of prototype vehicles must be adequate to assure vehicles built with the Double-V Hull provide improved protection to soldiers relative to existing vehicles. We are working with the Army to determine the numbers and types of prototypes required for testing and to develop a test plan that the Director will approve. Operational and Live Fire Testing for the Stryker Double-V hull design will focus on evaluating crew survivability throughout the expected threat spectrum. Testing will also assess whether vehicle mobility is adequate. This testing will inform decision makers prior to a production decision. Stryker Mobile Gun System Overall the program has mitigated, by either material fixes or changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), ten of the 23 deficiencies identified in the 2008 Secretary of Defense Report to Congress. We have reviewed the Army's semi-annual report to Congress updating the status of actions taken by the Army to mitigate Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) deficiencies. Based on that review, we assess the following remaining deficiencies as being the highest priority for correction: * Mission Equipment Package (MEP) Reliability - The MEP demonstrated 53 Mean Rounds Between System Abort (MRBSA) during the October 2007 Initial Operational Test (IOT) versus the requirement of 81 rounds. To validate the effectiveness of actions taken to improve MEP reliability, the Army must conduct an operational gunnery event using qualified crews firing a sufficient number of rounds. * Develop Long-Term Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) and Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Solution - There has been no change to the DOT&E assessment that the proposed Stryker Reactive Armor Tile (SRAT II) configuration for the MGS is in early development and the effectiveness of the SRAT II has yet to be demonstrated. While the Army approved the plan for the area of the vehicle to be covered by SRAT II in December 2009, the integration of SRAT II on the MGS has not yet occurred. Once the Army defines how SRAT II will be applied to the MGS, the Army must conduct live fire testing to demonstrate the tile's effectiveness in defeating RPGs and ATGMs. * Increase Gun Pod Protection Level - The Army has eliminated the requirement that the MGS be transportable on the C-130. Given the relief from this weight constraint, DOT&E reiterates the recommendation that the Army increase gun pod protection. The existing gun pod can be easily disabled, and when that occurs the MGS is not operationally effective. DOT&E will approve the Operational Test Plan for MEP Reliability and a Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan for RPG protection. All full-up system-level survivability tests should be completed and test results documented prior to the full-rate production decision. Ground Combat Vehicle and Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is currently in the very earliest stages of acquisition. In preparation for a Milestone A decision anticipated for September of this year, our office is working closely with the Army to develop a Test and Evaluation Strategy for the GCV program. At this point, the initial concept for GCV operational testing consists of a Limited User Test (LUT) prior to MS C and an Initial Operational Test (IOT) prior to the Full Rate Production decision. The LUT would be conducted by a mechanized infantry company with one platoon each of the two competing GCV prototypes and one platoon of current force Bradley Fighting Vehicles. This test structure would provide performance data to inform the source selection decision as well as providing the basis for a performance comparison between the GCV and the current Bradley, which the GCV is intended to replace. The IOT would be conducted with a full mechanized infantry company consisting of production representative GCV's. With regards to Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization, our office will be involved in test and evaluation of any future capability increments to the Army Brigade Combat Team, once the Army defines the associated acquisition strategies. Our level of involvement will be similar to our involvement with the testing of E-IBCT Increment 1. UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter The UH-60M Baseline aircraft completed its Initial Operational Test (IOT) in November 2006. The IOT was a 6-week, 216 hour test conducted by 4th Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment utilizing 5 production aircraft. The test demonstrated the aircraft was operationally effective, suitable, and survivable. In May 2007, DOT&E reported its test results, and in June 2007 the aircraft was approved for full rate production. Reports from units receiving the UH-60M Baseline confirm DOT&E's assessment. The UH-60M Upgrade was planned as a follow-on to the UH-60M Baseline. In January 2010, the Defense Acquisition Executive approved the Army's request to continue UH-60M Baseline production and not pursue production of the UH60M Upgrade configuration. DOT&E will continue to monitor and report on the UH-60 program. Assessment of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Factor (HMS) Test Plans The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) and Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) are schedule-driven programs working to complete system development prior to operational tests scheduled for November 2010. Readiness for and successful completion of these operational tests are dependent upon the success of developmental testing, development of supporting waveforms and network management tools, and the completion of user requirements such as radio network architectures and plans for network management. The JTRS HMS program completed the Rifleman Radio Limited User Test (LUT) in April 2009. This test highlighted deficiencies in reliability, battery life, range and an immature Concept of Operations. The Rifleman Radio reliability, battery life, and transmission range were each no better than 50% of the user requirements. The Concept of Operations did not provide sufficient radio discipline during combat. The program will conduct a series of tests from April through June 2010 to verify correction of deficiencies. The results of these tests will support a Milestone C review in August 2010. The program is scheduled to conduct the Rifleman Radio Initial Operational Test (IOT) in November 2010, in conjunction with the JTRS HMS Manpack LUT. The JTRS HMS program is executing Manpack radio developmental testing leading to the Manpack LUT in November 2010. This LUT will be conducted in conjunction with the Rifleman Radio IOT. Completion of planning for these tests awaits JTRS HMS Manpack user requirements. The JTRS GMR program is experiencing an eight-month delay in developmental testing due to late delivery of hardware and software. Because the schedule for conducting the GMR LUT in November 2010 has remained unchanged despite the delay in development, this shift in schedule has reduced the time available to develop corrective actions for deficiencies discovered during developmental testing prior to conducting the LUT. The JTRS GMR LUT is dependent upon the delivery of a functional Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) and network management tools. WNW version 3.1 demonstrated low throughput and poor message completion rates during the April 2009 WNW 30-Node Test. The JTRS Network Enterprise Domain (NED) has conducted production qualification testing on JTRS WNW version 4.0.1 and has made this version available for integration into GMR. The National Security Agency identified security issues with WNW 4.0.1 and will reassess an updated WNW 4.0.2 for corrections. The JTRS GMR is a critical component of the NIK and provides transfer of data, imagery and voice communications within the E-IBCT. Delays in the GMR program could affect plans for fielding the E-IBCT. The Army's ability to execute the overall JTRS test schedule leading to the three scheduled operational tests (Rifleman Radio IOT, Manpack LUT and GMR LUT) in November 2010 is of great concern due to a lack of time to address corrective actions, the dependence upon supporting waveform and network management success, and the need to complete user requirements. #DAL1234# |