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RADIO INTERVIEW WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL ANALYSTS MIKHAIL VINOGRADOV, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROV MAYAK RADIO, 12:15, FEBRUARY 7, 2006(Federal News Service (Russia) Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge) Anchor: This is Panorama on Mayak. I am Vladimir Averin. There is one old problem that we will have to talk about today. And this problem is relations between Russia and Georgia. As you probably know, the head of the parliamentary defense and national security committee, Mr. Targamadze, said yesterday that Russian peacekeepers in the Tskhinvali region could be called occupation troops and that Georgia therefore had a right to take measures, and use force among other things, in order to get them out of the area. So, this is a new symptom of the same old problem. Let us try to figure out what is happening with Russian- Georgian relations. With us today is Mikhail Vinogradov, the head of the Department of Political Consulting, the Center of Propaganda. Good day. Vinogradov: Good day. Anchor: And waiting on the telephone line is Mikhail Alexandrov, the head of the Department of the Transcaucasia, the Institute of the CIS countries. Can you hear us? Alexandrov: Yes, I can. Anchor: Good. Good day. Alexandrov: Good day. Anchor: I should tell our listeners that the cold weather must have done some damage to your car and you couldn't come here. There is this latest statement by the parliament. And the Georgian parliament's leadership is expected to meet today and it is going to adopt some crucial decisions. How could you assess this? Alexandrov: This can be assessed as a continuation of Georgia's previous policy of forcing the Russian military presence out of the Transcaucasia, in particular not from Georgia but from the area where a peacekeeping operation is underway in South Ossetia. This is a well known policy. Its purpose is what Georgia calls the restoration of territorial integrity in order to incorporate South Ossetia and Abkhazia with the help of the West. The Georgian leadership has come to realize that Russia has assumed a restrained position and insists solely on a peaceful settlement, but Georgia has seen that peaceful methods don't work because neither South Ossetians nor Abkhazians want to be in Georgia. This is why Georgia wants to use the same experience NATO used in Yugoslavia, specifically coercion toward certain forms of settlement in the interests of Georgia and therefore in the interests of NATO because NATO's interests there coincide with Georgia's interests as it is seeking to have a military presence in Transcaucasia and get access to the Caspian and Central Asia. So, Georgia does hope for NATO's assistance. Therefore, it has to force the Russian peacekeepers out of the region. To this end it has been using different forms of pressure and different provocations in the area of the conflict. Anchor: So, what you are saying is that this policy has been inspired by the West, particularly by NATO? Alexandrov: I simply think that the interests of Georgia and NATO coincide. Georgia wants to restore its territorial integrity by force, even though this is a debatable issue. And NATO wants the Russian military out of the region and is ready to play up to Georgia on that. Anchor: But on the other hand, the NATO Munich Conference showed that not everything is so simple within NATO. Angela Merkel reminded everybody that NATO is primarily a North Atlantic bloc, thus questioning the expediency of accelerated admission of Georgia and other countries. Can this be regarded as a signal to the Georgian leadership to sort of calm down a bit? Alexandrov: It seems that Germany is beginning to understand that further confrontation with Russia in all directions, because there are not only Georgia and the Transcaucasia, but there are also Ukraine and Moldova and Central Asia. NATO used to exert pressure in all directions. The Germans are probably beginning to understand that they are not going to benefit from this. Britain and the US may get something because their objective is to control global energy resources and their transportation routes. This is the purpose of their strategy in the Transcaucasia. But the Germans get everything from us as it is. Putin is willing to build a new gas pipeline for them and we make steady oil supplies. So, why should they help? Apparently there are different trends but support to Georgia is the dominant one. It may change or it may not. But there have been no noticeable real changes in the Transcaucasia policy. Anchor: Mikhail Yurievich, do you agree with this interpretation? Vinogradov: I would start from afar. When one analyzes Russia's relations with other post-Soviet countries, he always thinks about how to look at it. Is it that one country acts as a warmonger and another responds to this or is everything much complex? There is a country in the post-Soviet space whose leadership from time to time tries to rub, how should I put it, Russia and the Russian elite into it. This country is Turkmenistan. In all other conflicts, there, as a rule, is a bilateral process. I think this is true of Georgia as well. What are Georgia's interests like? I think Georgia's interests lie in imitating the restoration of territorial integrity -- Anchor: Imitating? Vinogradov: Well, it's not possible to bring Abkhazia back by force, and South Ossetia too. Like in the case of Yugoslavia, it's not quite clear whether the disintegration of the country has ended and it is being put back together piece by piece or the disintegration is continuing. I think the appearance of Ossetia within Georgia would seriously destabilize the country and create energy problems. So, Georgia needs to pretend that Russia assumes an unconstructive position and put pressure on it in the international arena by employing public methods in order to get some concessions or attract the attention of the West. And this is exactly what is happening. But a status quo would satisfy all sides. Georgia in this case will have an opportunity to appeal to international public. Russia will have a moral right, or so it thinks, to look down on the Georgian "sweet dwarf" and slap him in the back of the head from time to time. Abkhazia like Ossetia understands that it will never get a higher status than it has now. Anchor: I have another question then for Mikhail Alexandrov, about the status of Russian peacekeepers. They have an international mandate. over, the South Ossetian leadership says, let the OSCE come over here and see how things go and whether what the Russian peacekeepers do is consistent with their mandate or not. Why does Georgia make such aggressive statements? Why doesn't it appeal to the international community at the level of inspectors? Alexandrov: To begin with, the OSCE has a presence in Tskhinvali. Kokoity proposed to invite OSCE ambassadors. But that won't make a difference. Everybody is well aware of what is happening there. It's just that interests differ. The peacekeepers have an international mandate. The Georgian parliament's decision will have no impact on their mandate. In order to liquidate their mandate, Georgia has to denounce the Sochi accords of 1992 as a minimum. I don't know if Georgia can do that or not. But even if does this, this will create a gridlock because Georgia does not control the territory of South Ossetia, Georgian laws and decisions are not effective in South Ossetia, and our peacekeepers can simply move from the neutral zone to South Ossetia, and Georgia won't do anything about that unless it begins hostilities. If it begins hostilities, the outcome will be identical to that in Abkhazia. So, I think this is a policy of internationalizing the conflict, drawing NATO and the West into it in order to force Russia out of the region and then carry out a peacekeeping operation similar to that in Kosovo, suppressing the local population and driving part of it out of the country. As we know, practically all Serbs were driven out of Kosovo. Well, they may as well drive South Ossetians out, and only Georgians will remain. So, I think this is an actual policy, not its imitation. Anchor: There is a theoretical possibility to withdraw from the 1992 agreement. Can this be a normal step for Georgia? Alexandrov: I would not rule that out. They may withdraw from the agreement. But we must not give in to Georgian parliament and withdraw our troops from the conflict area because it was a multilateral decision, and other parties object to the withdrawal of the troops. Georgia may demand that they leave Georgian territory. They may move to South Ossetia, and that will be the end of it. Anchor: If the Georgian parliament adopts a decision that has so far been formulated by Mr. Targamadze, that force will be used, what should Russia do in this situation? Should it move its troops to South Ossetia, organize defense and that's it? Or should it respond to the use of force? Alexandrov: You see, if our troops move to South Ossetia and Georgia attacks them in South Ossetia, that will be a declaration of war. Therefore, we will have to retaliate, using all the power of our armed forces, to Georgia and at long last sort it out with that regime, put them on trial as war criminals, Saakashvili and his clique. So, it is necessary to act resolutely. Anchor: What is your point of view, Mr. Vinogradov? Vinogradov: I think that Mikhail Saakashvili is a politician whose lever is the threat of the use of force, rather than the use of force proper. The threat of the use of force helped him establish control over Adzharia. He has tried to act in a similar way in other countries. I think Saakashvili does not have sufficient military potential for a serious use of force. Today, he finds it necessary to imitate a victory, internationalize the conflict. I agree with Mikhail in this respect. They want international troops to be brought in there, if possible. Vladimir Putin's statement made recently, when he compared the situation in Georgia's breakaway autonomies with Kosovo, indicates that Russia is hypothetically, well, I would not say ready, but it does not see this option as totally unacceptable. And Saakashvili will pretend that he has won a victory, that occupation forces have been moved out of Georgian territory. But it is very unlikely that the deployment of international peacemaking forces can qualitatively change the situation. Anchor: The last question for Mr. Alexandrov. You have said that there are NATO's interests, that there are the West's interests, and Georgia has pursued those interests. A question in this connection: Are there Russian interests in the region? Or, should international forces be allowed to be deployed there, while our troops would move away to focus on other problems? Alexandrov: We should not move away. What does it mean, international forces? That would mean that Russia's role would substantially decrease in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and NATO would be able to focus on the creation of its military bridgehead in Georgia, Georgia would be able to join NATO, and they would then put pressure on Azerbaijan so Azerbaijan would join NATO, and they would move on to the Caspian. So, we certainly cannot retreat. Anchor: On the other hand, our politicians have stated that every sovereign state has the right to decide for itself and join any international organizations. Alexandrov: Yes, it has the right to join, but we should not necessarily -- Anchor: Help it create conditions for that. Alexandrov: And we are not obliged to endlessly recognize Georgia's so-called territorial integrity, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially given that the Kosovo precedent is being considered already. Kosovo may gain independence. And Putin has hinted that we are also ready to consider independence of those states. Anchor: Thank you very much. Let me thank Mikhail Alexandrov, head of the Transcaucasus unit at the CIS Countries Institute, for participation. We are staying here with Mikhail Vinogradov. You can send your questions to our pager. Let me explain. We also invited the Georgian parliament's speaker Nino Burdzhanadze to take part in this discussion and we proposed that she would convey the Georgian side's position. I negotiated this all day yesterday and in the morning today, with her numerous aides, not herself. And the tone gives me grounds to say that the Georgian side does not want to explain its position to the Russian audience. It does not want such an open dialog on line. This is very unfortunate to me, especially as my personal meetings with Ms. Burdzhanadze in the past produced a very good impression on me. But let us go back to our discussion of Russian-Georgian relations. Still, I am concerned a lot about prospects. Is it possible to shout endlessly: we will beat you and you will only retreat? Will a moment come when some action will be taken? Well, they will take some action, and Russia will really have to react, counteract. Vinogradov: It is quite possible to do this endlessly. Anchor: Possible? It looks like this does not worry anyone a lot, judging by what our deputy prime minister said in Munich. He said very calmly that Russia is interested in having goodneighborly relations with Georgia. Period. Vinogradov: I think this is the way it has lasted for several years already. This way Russian officials have dealt with their own problems. It is certainly preferable for them when Georgia is discussed, rather than the family of the defense minister, the situation in the Russian army. The public opinion promptly reacts and unites against malevolent Georgia, which in an alliance with allegedly anti-Russian NATO has malicious plans, even though it is clear that NATO troops in the Caucasus mostly protect Russia as part of the notorious golden billion against unstable Iran, unstable Afghanistan and contradictory China. Anchor: Again, if we take a look at Georgia's position in this alliance with the West, whose attitude is bad to, say, Iran -- you may recall articles in our newspapers: using American money, Georgia is buying gas from America's enemies in Iran. This is the link. Georgia does not have common borders with the United States. It has common borders with Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran. They are its neighbors. What is their attitude to what is happening in Russian-Georgian relations? They cannot but react. Vinogradov: I think those countries will pragmatically look for their benefits. Iran, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan are looking at the Georgian gas market, quite sympathetically, and I think they will use that. For other countries -- well, Azerbaijan has its own topical issue, its own separatist autonomy, which is also beyond control. But they are used to that problem, in principle, and even serious changes in Russian-Georgian relations are unlikely to cause any further serious destabilization in the region. No one expects those changes to really take place. Everyone is used to that and they treat this conflict as a certain rite. Anchor: Dogs bark and the caravan moves on. This logic works for everyone, for all parties. Vinogradov: Yes, I think so. over, Georgia's cooperation with Iran has been approved in principle by the United States. It has played a certain peacemaking part in complex relationships between the United States and Iran. Anchor: Let us listen to phone calls. Q: Good day. I am Lidia Ivanovna, Moscow. Georgia forgets that in the past it used to be constantly under threats of conquest by Turkey. And Czar Georgy XII revived the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783 -- Anchor: Yes, perhaps. Perhaps, they hope that the authorities have changed in Turkey since? Q: Let me go on -- and he asked Emperor Pavel I to grant Georgia Russia's protectorate. Russia rescued Georgia. It saved it from the fate of Armenia, where 1.5 million ethnic Armenians were slain. Anchor: That's clear. And Georgia should be grateful forever. Okay. Does this mean, in line with the logic of our listener, Lidia Ivanovna, that Russia can now behave any way it likes with respect to Georgia, while Georgia tolerate all that, while being grateful? Or, is there any other logic? Are there grounds to accuse Russia? Are there grounds for Georgia to do that? Let us try to take a look from the Georgian side. Perhaps, they find that Russia somewhat misbehaves and Georgia, while being ever grateful, has to break everything inside the country and resist that pressure. Vinogradov: You know, while being a historian by education, I know that history never teaches anyone, on the one hand. On the other, all references to history, as a rule, are quite speculative and not objective. The situation is different today. Pavel I has not been with us for about 200 years. The Osman Empire no longer exists. We have Turkey, which is totally different since Ataturk. Far from everything is always perfect in relations between Georgia and Turkey, but there is no threat to territorial integrity of what is left of Georgia from outside, only from inside. Anchor: A question from out pager. "Even our children will perhaps come to realize that our foreign policy is too yielding," Sergei writes. Vinogradov: The main problem of Russia's foreign policy is that its goals and interests have not been formulated. If Russia explains, to itself first and foremost, what it needs from Georgia, from Ossetia, Abkhazia, NATO, the world will be reasonable, simple and understandable. This is not happening at the moment. The state machinery is not targeted at attaining goals and pursuing interests, and the diplomatic establishment still less so. Q: I am Lev Nikolayevich. I am listening to your broadcast and it occurred to me, do the Georgian leaders understand that while the peacekeepers are there, they have an illusion of having incorporated these parts? And if they have our peacekeepers withdraw to the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then a state border is established between Georgia and another state, and there is no way back. Do they realize that? Vinogradov: They understand that. I think the Georgian leadership is interested in having peacekeeping troops. They would rather these were not Russian but international troops. That would be played up as a success of Georgian foreign policy. Anchor: Another wonderful question: "Can we cutoff electricity and gas supplies to Georgia? Will there be sanctions?" Vinogradov: Well, we can do that, but Georgia has means to retaliate. It has propaganda levers. Georgia can create serious difficulties for Russia in its bid to join the WTO, for example. In other words, the game is not worth the candle. Anchor: And besides I would remind the sender of this message that the Russian President has said that Russia does not see gas or electricity as political weapons. These are relations between business entities, if I am quoting the President right. Vinogradov: In fact, Russia is not very much interested in selling gas to Georgia because it would be much happier selling this gas at higher prices to the European market. Russia is ready to withdraw from the Georgian market. That would not seriously weaken Russia economically. As to whether it will weaken it politically, this is a question of ideology, mythology and geopolitics. Anchor: Another listener reminds us that we can play geopolitical chess as much as we like, but there is, for example, the problem of the Armenian population in Abkhazia. If Georgia goes into Abkhazia, then about 90,000 Armenians will most likely have to leave. What will happen to the Abkhazians? Vinogradov: A year and a half ago I drove through Abkhazia and I don't think it is realistic for Georgian troops to go into Abkhazia and stay there for any length of time. The country is full of monuments, museums and memorials and banners reading, "We have won!" Abkhazians feel very strong about it and every Abkhazian will tell you how he was fighting. Anchor: We can take one final phone call. Q: "I am Valery Vasilyevich from Gorki oblast. What is the economic interest for RAO UES Russia in operating the power industry in Georgia? Do we earn any profits there?" Vinogradov: Opinions among economists on that score differ. Some say we do derive some economic benefit, and some feel that it is of a political action. The latter point of view is frequently expressed and therefore appears to be convincing. Anchor: So, it is a politically motivated action. The implementation of the idea expressed by Chubais. Vinogradov: The idea of a "liberal empire." A simulation of the idea. Anchor: Simulation again. Unfortunately, this is not the first time we are discussing the Russian-Georgian relations and other CIS countries. And nearly always we come to the conclusion that most often it is a simulation of activities. Vinogradov: That is still better than bloodshed. Anchor: It is still better than an open conflict, but it is worse than a clear statement of interests and goals and policies aimed at achieving those goals. Vinogradov: Absolutely. Anchor: We will keep following the developments. Thank you. |