TMCnet News
ARTICLE BY ANDREI ILLARIONOV, PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ON RUSSIA-WEST RELATIONS KOMMERSANT DAILY, P.1,8, MAY 12, 2006(Federal News Service (Russia) Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge) A COLDISH WAR Andrei Illarionov, formerly adviser to the Russian President, thinks that, like in 1946, Moscow is initiating a downturn in the relations with the West. Stinging criticism of the speech delivered by Vice President Dick Cheney is just a convenient trick designed to create a new social atmosphere in Russia, an atmosphere of fear and mobilization which the Kremlin needs to achieve its political goals, as Andrei Illarionov argues in the article below. Much has changed in our country in the last three years. Economic policy, the political regime, the very essence of the Russian state, the ideology and philosophy of power have been radically revised. Now it is the turn of Russia's relations with the external world. Attack on Good Neighborhood The formal pretext for selling the U-turn in Russia's international policy to the public was the speech by the US Vice President Richard Cheney at the conference "Common Vision for a Common Neighborhood" in Vilnius. "Harsh statements", "ultimatum", "enemy at our gate", "declaration of a Cold War," "a new Fulton", "blasphemy" -- these are just some of the epithets the Russian politicians and media used to describe the speech by the No. 2 man in the US Administration. What did Cheney actually say about Russia? What prompted such comments? The major speech devoted to the promotion of democracy and freedom in the modern world devotes three paragraphs to Russia: some description and a few wishes and hopes. What does the descriptive part contain that distorts Russian reality and that is unknown to Russian citizens themselves? That "in Russia today opponents of reform are seeking to reverse the gains of the last decade?" Everybody knows that. That "in many areas of civil society -- from religion and the news media, to advocacy groups and political parties -- the government has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people?" This is not news. That "oil and gas become tools of intimidation and blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation?" We can watch live coverage of energy wars on television. That "no one can justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor?" But this is the official position of the Russian authorities. So, did Cheney say anything new? He said what he was not expected to say. He extended to Russia an offer of friendship and strategic partnership, free trade and a century of peace, respect of national culture and a living down of past conflicts, of interaction of "sovereign (make a note of that) democracies" and cooperation within the G8. And the most horrible thing that Cheney said was this: "None of us believes that Russia is fated to become an enemy." The so-called knight of the Cold War extended a hand of friendship and an olive branch. What Cheney did not say, but should have said (according to notions and expectations) was said for him by the Russian propaganda. And yet, come to think of it, Cheney could have opted for an aggravation. For example, he could have reacted to the words of the Russian Foreign Minister about "radical differences between the foreign policy philosophy of Moscow and the approaches of some Western capitals." He could have responded to the words from the Russian President's article about redistribution of energy in the world in line with the "priorities of a small group of states." But Cheney chose not to say anything like that. He spoke about other things and this turned out to be his main "crime": "The spread of democracy is an unfolding of history; it is a benefit to all and a threat to none. The best neighbor a country can have is a democracy -- stable, peaceful and open to relations of commerce and cooperation instead of suspicion and fear." The reply came five days later in the President's Address to the Federal Assembly. Its main thrust is mobilization -- economic, demographic, scientific and educational. Historical Parallels It would serve a useful purpose to put the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and the US and the West as a whole in a historical perspective. In the morning of December 7, 1941 the US was suddenly attacked by a formidable enemy as a result of which several thousand people died. Almost 60 years later, in the morning of September 11, 2001, the US was again attacked, as a result of which thousands of people died. In 1941 the US got an important ally in the USSR, cooperation with which in that war produced major victories. Sixty years later the US also got an important ally in the war that broke out. The ally was Russia, in cooperation with which serious victories were scored in a new war. Some time after the beginning of that war the allies discovered that they have radical differences on a growing list of issues. Sixty years on, history is repeating itself: the positions of yesterday's strategic partners are beginning to diverge in a fundamental way on a growing range of issues. In 1945-1946 the most serious differences between the US and the USSR came to the surface in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea basin, the Middle East, Greece, Turkey and Iran. Sixty years on, the most serious contradictions are in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea basin, in Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia and Iran. In 1946 one of the sharpest international crises was caused by the occupation of northern Iran by the Soviet troops. Sixty years on one of the sharpest international crises is again unfolding around Iran. In 1946 the USSR proposed to the Iranian government to create a joint venture in the field of energy, at that time hydrocarbon energy. Sixty years on, Russia has proposed to the Iranian government creating a joint venture in the field of energy, this time nuclear energy. In 1946 the Iranians brilliantly hoodwinked Soviet diplomacy. Sixty years on, the same story repeated itself. In February 1946, Stalin delivered a speech at a meeting with voters at the Bolshoi Theater. Summing up the lessons of the recently ended war he formulated a key lesson of success: the country had been preparing for war over three five-year periods. And he went on to formulate a new goal: three five-year plan periods were needed. There was no doubt among observers about the message of Stalin's speech: instead of peace and cooperation with the allies, the USSR was preparing for a new war. Soon afterwards Winston Churchill made one of the most celebrated attempts to prevent a confrontation. Describing what was happening on the other side of the iron curtain that had fallen over Europe in a speech in Fulton, Churchill called not for war -- a shooting or a cold one. He called for peaceful cooperation with the USSR and a prevention of a military catastrophe. Stalin's reply was not long in coming. Nine days later Churchill was described as a "warmonger", and needless to say, Stalin's propaganda did not ascribe the start of the Cold War to the speech at the Bolshoi Theater. Sixty years on, history in some ways is repeating itself. The fundamental decision to break the relations of alliance and partnership with the US and the West was published in a series of public statements by Russian leaders in January-March 2006 that passed largely unnoticed. Richard Cheney a week ago made an attempt to ward off the mounting crisis and restore cooperation. The reaction from Moscow demonstrated convincingly that it was anything but what the Russian authorities wanted. Today they need confrontation. Today they need an enemy, preferably an external one. Why? A New Mobilization To fight the West in earnest? Present-day Russia has no resources for a full-scale showdown. So, it needs a virtual confrontation intended for domestic than foreign consumption. There are two reasons for that. The first is the need to promptly make use of the windfall profits due to an unprecedented situation in the international markets. And to this end it is necessary to generate a sense of danger, a sense of fear. The arsenal of former threats -- from terrorists to fascists -- turns out not to be impressive enough to justify the spending of tens of billions of dollars. External threats are needed ("Comrade Wolf is choosing his victims himself.") It doesn't matter who the victim is and where. What matters is a sense of danger. The other reason has to do with domestic politics. It is awkward to lose out to the intellectual opposition on every count. And yet only the use of brute force can prevent it happening. Now everything should change. Just yesterday the adherence of this or that citizen, party, organization or newspaper to the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, openness and tolerance had to be tolerated (well, it takes all sorts to make Russian politics). Tomorrow there will be no need for toleration. Tomorrow these people will no longer be regarded as mere oddballs. Tomorrow it will be seen as national treachery, high treason, activities of enemies of the people. And there is no doubt as to what to do about those who are not with us. The country is turning into a single camp, a war camp for starters. Of course, historical parallels are never complete. And, as is known, history sometimes repeats itself as a farce. Be that as it may, it is obvious that the path chosen by the present-day Russian authorities leads into a historical dead end. We have been there before. We have already paid a high price for it. It is because of this that the place of Russia in today's world is incomparably modest than the place of the post-war USSR. And if Russia reverts to that path, it will be still modest. Andrei Illarionov is President of the Economic Analysis Institute. Copyright 2006 Federal News Service, Inc. All Rights Reserved. |