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Vietnam New Frontier In India's Look East Policy - Analysis [Eurasia Review]
[September 17, 2014]

Vietnam New Frontier In India's Look East Policy - Analysis [Eurasia Review]


(Eurasia Review Via Acquire Media NewsEdge) Days ahead of India hosting Chinese President Xi Jinping on 17 September, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Vietnam from 14 to 17 September. The aim of the President's visit was to seal political and cultural ties demonstrating India's strategic support for Vietnam. The two countries also signed important agreements in the field of defence, trade, culture and education. MoUs were also signed on the areas of animal husbandry, custom cooperation, fish farming, youth exchanges, monument restoration and joint ventures for oil and gas exploration between OVL and Petro Vietnam.



India's increasing engagement with Vietnam does not simply mean having friendly relations; the factors driving this go beyond diplomatic protocols. The changing security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is shaping the foreign policy priorities and security strategies of most of the nations in the region are being recast. Security analysts see commonly this new trend as a response to increasing assertiveness by China on regional issues, which has created a sense of unease. The threat perception is also leading the smaller nations to strengthen their defence capabilities to cope with the perceived Chinese threat. Before going into the details of the significance of President Mukherjee's visit to Vietnam in bilateral context, it would be appropriate to examine the visit in a regional context.

New arms Race? As China continues to flex its military muscle, a sense of discomfort is felt in the neighbourhood. China has territorial issues with a host of countries in the region such as with India, Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and others. The adversary countries are therefore in a mad rush to beef up their own military capabilities, if not to deter China, at least to try to defend their sovereignty whenever the situation warrants. Jack Chang of the Associates Press filed recently a report that highlights some of this trend in the Asia-Pacific region.1 It is relevant to highlight some of the points of the report here in the context of analysing India-Vietnam ties.


According to Chang, several Asian nations are arming up in response to a resurgent China that lays claims on territories that are disputed. Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines in particular, are strengthening their defence capabilities in response to the Chinese challenge. While Vietnam has nearly doubled its military spending, Japan is seeking its biggest-ever defence budget. The Philippines too has plans to have a viable navy. In South Asia, with a problematic neighbour Pakistan, India has border disputes with China and therefore modernises its armed forces to meet this twin challenge. At the same time, India has kept diplomatic channels always open as a foreign policy strategy and not to allow tensions to escalate. For South Korea, its immediate neighbour, the North's perpetual threat is a continuous worry. Though it has security ties with the US and warmed up relations with China, the sense of disquiet continues and therefore it makes sense for it to strengthen its own defence capabilities to face with immediate contingencies.

What do these developments mean in the regional context? The cumulative effect of defence spending by the Asian nations mean that Asia now accounts for about half of the world's arms imports. China leads in this race by quadrupling its annual military budget over the past decade. This military boost is fanned by the economic wealth that it has acquired, putting its potential adversaries at a disadvantage.

Some security analysts have started to take the view that Beijing's muscular behaviour in its neighbourhood is a part of its long-term objective to emerge as the dominant power in the Pacific by dislodging the US. The late Indian eminent Sinologist Professor V.P. Dutt had articulated such a view of China almost half a decade ago. Taking control of the vital shipping lanes in the South China Sea and "potentially lucrative pockets of oil and natural gas under East Asian waters" is a part of achieving its long-term goal. Robert D. Kaplan, chief geopolitical analyst for the US-based intelligence research firm Stratfor, for example, takes this line of argument.2 According to him, Beijing has a distinctive edge over Vietnam and the Philippines in increasing its military capacity in the South and East China Sea. "If China is able to move freely and exercise more control of its adjacent seas, it will become a full-fledged naval power", observes Kaplan.3 However, Beijing has to traverse a long journey to catch up with the US. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the US military spending is $665 billion a year, which is more than the next eight countries combined and triple that of China.4 Yet, China's spending nearly equals the total defence budget of all 24 other countries in East and South Asia. In particular, China's Asian neighbours fear about its plans to beef up naval capability. China's submarine fleet is projected to match US number by 2020, at 78 each. The fear is that many of the Chinese submarines will be stationed at a giant underwater base on Hainan Island, close to the South China Sea.

Other Asian nations are not sitting idle and responding to the Chinese plan by their own defence acquisitions. In a rush, many Asian nations are on shopping spree. In 2014, Vietnam received the third of six submarines it ordered from Russia and maritime patrol aircraft capable of hunting down Chinese submarines. Ironically when the major powers strategise plans to deepen economic interdependence and seek forums to foster and promote such plans, they at the same time engage in arms exports, thereby indulging in wasteful expenditure that could have been used for well being of people across the globe. No wonder, Russia is the top military exporter to Asia, followed by the US and then European countries such as the Netherlands.

Because of China's recent assertive stances in the South China Sea, where it claims almost 90 per cent as its own, including the areas that Vietnam claims, Vietnam's fear seems to be real. The unpleasant experience of May 2014 when ships of the two countries rammed each other repeatedly after China moved an oil rig into waters claimed by both, unnerved Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam is seeking friends and strengthening its own military capability. Its military spending has expanded by 83 per cent over the past five years, accounting for 8 per cent of government spending.5 Like Vietnam, Japan too is modernising its submarines by replacing its entire fleet with modern ones. South Korea is adding bigger attack submarines and India plans to build six new subs. Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Stockholm institute observes: “Submarines are seen as a potential for an underdog to cope with a large adversary. They can move silently and deny aerial or maritime control.”6 The Philippines is the weakest and incapable of standing up to the Chinese challenge and therefore welcome the US troops back to its bases after 20 years. Though it plans to boost spending on maritime patrol aircraft, bomber and other hardware, its resources are limited. It, therefore, seeks legal recourse by taking up the maritime dispute case to the international court of justice for arbitration. This, however, should not be seen as the Philippines' pusillanimity as it did not deter to sentence some Chinese fishermen who were caught in Philippines waters. Yet, military modernization remains a priority in response to the changed security environment in its neighbourhood.

In South Asia, though India too is engaged in defence acquisition and has bought many tanks and jet fighters, thereby emerging as a major arms importer in the world, and has stationed a sizable contingent of mountain troops near disputed stretches of its border with China, it still prefers to keep diplomatic options open. In fact, while the Modi government has allowed 49 per cent FDI in the defence sector, it has kept India's doors open for Chinese investment and therefore wants to engage economically.

Such military drives by Asian nations do not, however, underplay the role of Coast Guards. Therefore, in June 2014, Japan donated six Coast Guard vessels to Vietnam, after pledging 10 to the Philippines in 2013. On its own, Vietnam has nearly doubled its Coast Guard fleet to 68 vessels over the past five years, according to the U.K.-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.7 And Japan has expanded its main Coast Guard fleet by 41 vessels, for a total of 389 ships. The use of such vessels has been crucial for Japan as it defends its claims to several uninhabited islands in Senkaku (Chinese call Diaoyu).

Despite these countries engaged in strengthening their military capabilities in different ways, none of them are willing to escalate a situation when an outright military confrontation becomes unavoidable. Most of these nations are trying to establish some sort of armed presence to deter the potential aggressor without allowing the situation to develop to a more dangerous level and thus not cross the threshold.

Japan's sense of unease is no different. It has historical and territorial issues with China and South Korea. It faces constant threats from North Korea as well. Prime Minister Abe is aware of these and pursuing policies that could help maintain peace and stability in the region, while at the same time preparing the nation to deal with possible escalation. In August 2014, his government requested his country’s biggest-ever military budget — $48 billion — with outlays for P-1 surveillance aircraft, stealth fighters and other US-built hardware. In April it relaxed restrictions on arms exports. In July, Abe’s Cabinet approved a reinterpretation of the country’s constitution allowing it to defend American and other foreign troops under attack and use force even if Japan is not under attack. During Modi's visit to Japan on 30 August, Japan and India pledged to share defense technologies and hold joint military exercises. It thus transpires that as China becomes more bellicose, the adversarial countries see winds of opportunity to strengthen their own military and defence ties. Whether such moves are step towards dealing with possibly a more violent situation or to deter those responsible for the creation of such a situation would remain in the realm of speculation. President Mukherjee's visit to Vietnam needs to be seen and understood from this wider perspective of peace-building initiative at a time when the security situation in the region does not seem to be safe.

Responding to Vietnam's friendship Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1972, India-Vietnam relationship has developed intensively, reflected by the increase in high-level visits. Bilateral ties were upgraded into a strategic partnership in 2007, underpinning the importance that each attach to the other. Since coming to power in May 2014, the Modi government has strongly promoted India's "Look East" policy in which Vietnam is regarded as a "pillar". External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj's visit to Vietnam on 25-26 August added a new driving force to the strategic partnership between not only the two nations but was a clear demonstration of what India's Look East policy would be under Modi's dispensation. While Swaraj was in Hanoi, she had a comprehensive discussion with 15 Heads of Missions in Southeast and East Asia to chart out initiatives that the Modi government has envisioned for the strategically important region.

The kind of importance India attaches to its ties with Vietnam can be judged from the fact when India made public its plans to supply BrahMos cruise missiles to Vietnam, just ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's maiden visit to India, thereby sending out a strong message about its desire to play a greater role in regional security in Southeast Asia.8 Defence officials of both the countries are already on discussions on this matter, which seems already at an advanced stage.

India had to obtain permission from Russia as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles are produced by a joint venture of Defence Research and Development Organisation and Russia's NPO Mashinostroeyenia. Though several countries like Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia have evinced interest in importing the Brahmos, Vietnam could be the first country to have a deal with Brahmos Aerospace Private Limited for import of the missiles. Moscow and Hanoi are also in discussion on a joint programme for developing a missile system in Vietnam based on the Kh-35 Uran of Russia. Hanoi feels negotiations on this may be delayed and as an immediate requirement to meet with the security challenges arising out of its escalating tensions with Beijing over conflicting territorial claims in the waters of South China Sea, the Brahmos is a better option for Vietnam. The Brahmnos issue was discussed when general secretary of Vietnam Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited India in November 2013.

India has also offered Hanoi a credit line worth about $100 million to procure military hardware from India. The modalities for implementation of the credit line were discussed during Mukherjee's visit. Besides the Brahmos missiles, India agreed in 2013 to train 500 Vietnamese sailors to make better use of their newly-purchased submarines and payload of new Klub submarine-launched anti-ship missiles.

The India-Russia-Vietnam cooperation is developing in a manner whose strategic significance cannot be missed. In August 2014, Vietnam purchased another 12 Su-30MK2 fighters – a long-range, marine strike aircraft – and hopes to have 36 of the aircraft deployed by 2015. In pursuant of its Look East policy, both nations signed an agreement during President Mukherjee's visit that included Indian training for Vietnamese Su-30 pilots.

The Brahmos missile claims speed of Mach 3.0+ and a range of more than 180 miles. The missile is one of the fastest anti-ship missile made and a significant anti-ship cruise missile threat, able to reach targets well into the South China Sea and therefore has huge strategic value for Vietnam. "Altogether, these submarines, Sukhoi fighter jets, and supersonic cruise missiles have the makings of a very effective deterrent threat and Anti-Access/Area-Denial (or A2/AD) strategy for Vietnam. A2/AD strategies are intended to prevent navies from projecting power into an area, and came into the spotlight in the defense community a few years ago, when China shifted to such an approach to deny the US access to the Western Pacific."9 Indeed, India-Vietnam relations are developing successfully, built on the five pillars of politics, economy, security-defence, science and technology, and culture and education. Bilateral trade is also looking up, increasing from a total of $3.4 billion in 2010 to an estimated figure of $8 billion in 2014. Both sides are striving to increase trade value to $10 billion in 2015 and $15 billion by 2020. As many as 68 Indian-invested projects worth approximately $1 billion are in operation in Vietnam, mainly focusing on oil and gas exploration, mineral exploitation and processing, sugar production, agricultural chemicals, information technology and food processing. Vietnamese companies have also invested $23.6 million in three projects in India.

Vietnam is keen to learn from Indian experience and expertise in the IT sector and wants to strengthen knowledge-based partnership. India has already helped Vietnam set up IT and English training centres as well as business development institutes. India also supported Vietnam in setting up a rice research institute, making the country to emerge as a rice exporter. Under the Indian Technological and Economic Cooperation Programme, hundreds of Vietnamese students have benefitted to avail scholarship and study in India every year.

Apart from talks on sale of Brahmos missiles, both sides have deepened defence collaboration by establishing deputy defence minister-level strategic dialogue. Both have also accelerated joint naval exercises. Vietnam has a much longer wish list, however. It wants surveillance equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, tanks, ships and of course the Brahmos missiles. India can also train Vietnamese naval staff for the next 3 kilo Class submarines. At the regional and international levels such as the ASEAN, East Asia Summit (EAS), the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), both have closely cooperated and shared common interests.

India is keen to expand its footprint in the contested region of South China Sea as President Mukherjee took along with him oil and gas minister Dharmendra Pradhan to sign an important oil and gas deal. Vietnam, which has given two gas exploration blocks to Indian company OVL, offered two more blocks to India. OVL and Petro Vietnam signed a letter of intent in Hanoi. The feasibility study for the blocks is on. OVL has also invited Petro Vietnam to invest in exploration off the Indian coast.

The lease for the two oil blocks which Vietnam had offered to OVL had expired and Vietnam extended the lease. India's OVL had felt that the oil blocks, Nos. 127 and 128 had little commercial value because it concluded that there was little prospect of striking oil in that area. After India gave up the blocks in 2012, Vietnam persuaded India to stay on to explore further and India agreed. That renewal agreement was signed during President Mukherjee's visit. India's OVL has ignored China's objection to collaborate with Petro Vietnam in hydrocarbon exploration off the coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea since it is engaged in the area since 1988. To make matters messy, China's National Offshore Oil Corporation issued a notification in June 2014 offering one block in the South China Sea for foreign collaboration, including part of a block Vietnam had awarded to OVL. In such a situation, if Chinese naval vessels move to disturb the Indian exploration mission in areas Vietnam claims its own, the Indian navy willy-nilly might be drawn into confrontation to protect its national interests. Diplomatic intervention at the appropriate time must prevent such escalation if and when that occurs.

Vietnam has welcomed Indian naval vessels at its strategically located Cam Ranh Bay, which is often described as one of the jewels of Vietnam. This is one of the best water sea port facilities in the world. There is also an Air Force base with good runaways for state of the art aircraft nearby. The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force can take advantage of Vietnam offer of use of such facilities, thereby strengthen the strategic partnership and help defend the global commons such as the freedom of navigation in the open seas.10 Concluding observations Even when Prime Minister Modi hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping while President Mukherjee traveled to Hanoi to sign some important deals, the political message of timing the visit cannot be overlooked. The aim to strengthen the strategic bond in a comprehensive manner could be deciphered from the fact that apart from the Brahmos sale and other defence-related issue, the President also took measures to seal political and cultural ties, including gifting a sapling of the banyan tree of Bodh Gaya as a gift for Vietnam. Vietnam was pleased to place the sapling at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi.

So President Mukherjee's trip was more than just another of his trips to a friendly country. It was intended to convey India's strategic support to Vietnam, which is facing to cope with Beijing's belligerence in the South China Sea and therefore must have been reassuring to Hanoi. India's presence in the South China Sea is not just because it has collaborated with Petro Vietnam for oil exploration activities and therefore would protect its strategic interests but also because India has a principled stand on free lanes of navigation and access to resources as per the United Nations Law of the Seas. Unless China learns to respect global rules and tones down its expansionist maritime aim, it will precipitate a situation when India will have compelling reasons to increase its own naval presence to protect its own strategic assets/interests and those of other nations friendly to it.

Dr. Rajaram Panda is The Japan Foundation Fellow at Reitaku University, Chiba, JAPAN. E-mail: [email protected] 1. Jack Chang, "Asian countries arm up to counter growing China as it jostles with neighbors in disputed seas", Associate Press, 11 September 2014, http://www.startribune.com/world/274714521.html 2. Quoted in https://johnib.wordpress.com/tag/asia-pacific/ 3. Ibid.

4. "Arms Industry", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry 5. Chang, n. 1.

6. Quoted in William Lowther, "Little Progress made on sub program in US", 13 September 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/13/2003599631/2 7. Quoted in Chang, n.1.

8. Anirban Bhaumik, "India plans to supply Vietnam Brahmos missiles", Deccan Herald, 12 September 2014, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/430576/india-plans-supply-vietnam-brahmos.html 9. "Vietnam Working More Closely with India, Russia to Counter China", 12 September 2014, https://johnib.wordpress.com/tag/asia-pacific/ 10. P.K. Chakravorty, "President's Visit to Further Boost India-Vietnam Ties", 10 September 2014, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2014/september/10/president-s-visit-to-further-boost-india-vietnam-ties The post Vietnam New Frontier In India's Look East Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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