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Taiwan politics: Chen provokes China, again
(EIU Viewswire Via Thomson Dialog NewsEdge)COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian, announced on February 27th that he would scrap both the National Unification Council (NUC) and the guidelines it established in 1991 for Taiwan's eventual reunification with China. Rather than reflecting any specific change in cross-Strait relations, the move seems calculated to reinvigorate flagging support for Mr Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)possibly by provoking China into a reaction. However, Beijing is unlikely to risk boosting support for Mr Chen by responding aggressively to the move. It is more likely that the US will seek instead to restrain the president from unilaterally changing the status quo in the remaining two years of his term.
The scrapping of the NUC will have no impact on the conduct of cross-Strait policy by Taiwan's government, as it has not been convened since before Mr Chen took office in 2000. The council was established by the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist party) government in 1990, partly as a show of conciliation to China and partly to placate pro-reunification hardliners who opposed the KMT's plans to abandon its historical claim to represent the mainland. In 1991 the NUC issued National Unification Guidelines specifying that reunification would be gradual and could only come about in a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China. In recent years, with the pro-independence DPP in the ascendant, the NUC and the guidelines have performed only a symbolic function.
Nonetheless, Mr Chen's decision to abandon them is significant, as it contradicts the five pledges he made when he took office in 2000 (which were not to declare independence, change Taiwan's official name, hold a referendum on or promulgate a new constitution specifying Taiwan's statehood, or renounce the NUC and its guidelines). Mr Chen has not explained directly why he feels it is now necessary to go back on these pledges, although he has cited China's growing military threat to Taiwan and his opinion that the guidelines are undemocratic, placing limits on the ability of the Taiwanese people to decide the future direction of cross-Strait policy.
Political causes
The move has more to do with domestic politics than any change in cross-Strait relations, though. Owing to a series of corruption scandals, legislative deadlock and indecisive policymaking, the popularity of the president and the DPP has been falling in recent months, while the party has been stricken by internal divisions. In early December the DPP lost heavily in local elections, prompting the resignation of the party chairman (and the appointment of a new premier in January). After the elections, Mr Chen disappeared from the public eye for a month, before making a controversial speech on January 1st in which he warned of the dangers to Taiwanese businesses of investing heavily in the mainlandsignaling his intention to tighten cross-Strait policy.
Since then he has continued on the same theme, presumably with the hope of rallying the DPP's core pro-independence supporters (who have complained that Mr Chen has not been aggressive enough in promoting Taiwan's interests) before a series of crucial elections: for the mayorships of Taipei and Kaohsiung at the end of 2006, for the Legislative Yuan (parliament) in 2007 and for the presidency in 2008. Mr Chen is also presumably hoping to regain the initiative on formulating cross-Strait policy. In recent months he has been sidelined while China has been courting the KMT and Taiwanese businesses, offering various economic and diplomatic incentives for Taiwan to ease restrictions on cross-Strait trade and transport links.
However, it is unlikely that scrapping the NUC will reverse Mr Chen's or the DPP's fortunes. Disillusionment with the president and the party runs deep even with DPP membersonly 20% of whom bothered to vote in an election to select a new party chairman in January. Shifting to a more aggressive policy towards China will not solve the president's main problems: that the DPP has lost its reputation for probity and that Mr Chen is perceived as autocratic and ideologically inconsistent.
The move is also likely to alienate further the large number of Taiwanese voters who favour the maintenance of the status quo, businesspeople in particular. The business lobby will be wary about any risk to their investments on the mainland, estimated by the government to total US$100bn (although the actual figure is thought to be much higher since much cross-Strait investment is not officially accounted for or passes through Hong Kong or other countries). Businesses are likely to side with the KMT's assessment that Mr Chen's latest move reveals his priorities are incorrect and that he should instead be focusing on the economy.
Mixed reactions
Mr Chen's political troubles are one reason why China is unlikely to react forcefully to his decision to scrap the NUC. As their meetings with the KMT in recent months reveal, Beijing's leaders are hoping that the KMT candidate will be victorious in 2008with any luck after the party has defeated the DPP in the parliamentary vote. There is little reason to risk an upsurge in support for the DPP or Mr Chen's pro-independence position by reacting belligerently. However, the scrapping of the NUC was deemed sufficiently serious for the Chinese Communist Party and China's Taiwan Affairs Office to issue a joint statement on February 28th insisting the move would "bring disaster to Taiwan society".
Mr Chen might expect to face more immediate action by the US, Taiwan's most important diplomatic ally. The US is obliged under various laws to protect Taiwan in the event of invasion by China and as such is committed to preventing any unilateral change to the status quo. The five pledges in Mr Chen's 2000 inauguration speech were intended partly to reassure the US that he was not going to launch Taiwan on the path to independence. It is believed that Washington attempted to persuade Mr Chen not to go back on these pledges (after he first announced his intention at the end of January to scrap the NUC). This might be why Mr Chen avoided using the word "abolish" (feichu) in his announcement, saying instead the NUC would "cease to function".
It's not dead, it's only resting
This allowed the US, in a press briefing on the issue on February 27th, to claim the NUC had not been abolished but merely frozen. But in reality there is little confusion about the import of Chen's wordszhongzhi, meaning "cease", can also be interpreted as "terminate" or "put an end to". This much was acknowledged by the head of Taiwan's National Security Council, Chiu I-jen (a close adviser to Mr Chen), who admitted that the decision had obliterated the fifth of the president's pledges.
The US might therefore feel minded to rebuke Mr Chen for attempting to change the status quo unilaterally, as it did at the end of 2003 when he stoked cross-Strait tensions as part of his campaign for re-election. It will certainly want to avoid riling China ahead of the visit of the president, Hu Jintao, in April. But there is little Washington can do to stop Mr Chen from provoking China in the remaining two years of his term, especially if he determines that manufacturing a confrontation with the mainland is the only way to prevent himself from becoming a lame duckor his party from dwindling into obsolescence. If he has made this calculation, it seems likely that abolishing the NUC and its guidelines will not be the last move Mr Chen makes to further his pro-independence agenda.
Although there are political reasons for his tactics, there are valid strategic concerns too. Mr Chenand the DPP's core supportersmight well feel that time is running out for Taiwan to establish its sovereign rights. As China grows more economically and politically powerful, and as Taiwan's economy becomes more closely linked to that of the mainland, the opportunity for forging political independence is dwindling. This is exactly as China (and, arguably, the US) wants it. However, unless Mr Chen takes more-drastic measures, Beijing will be happy to bide its time in the hope that a more moderate KMT leader is elected in 2008.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Asia
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